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False Persuasion, Superficial
Heuristics, and the Power of
Logical Form to Test the Integrity
of Legal Argument
Stephen M. Rice*
“[A]rguments, like men, are often pretenders.”
Plato1
I.

An Introduction to the Practical Problem of Illogic in Legal
Argument

Lawyers hold themselves out to be masters of persuasion
but often fail to study two topics that are important to the art
of legal advocacy: logic2 and psychology.3 These topics are not
part of the mainstream law school curriculum. They are not
required topics on any state’s bar examination. While there are
justifications for the absence of these topics in the law school
curriculum, this absence seems strange considering that
lawyers study as specifically and intentionally as any other
group in our society to offer and scrutinize arguments designed
* Stephen M. Rice is an Associate Professor of Law, Liberty University
School of Law. The author would like to thank Lindsay Leonard, Jared
Williams, Brett Bloom, and Michael Minerva for their contributions in
support of this Article.
1. PLATO, Lysis, in THE SOCRATIC DIALOGUES 83, 110 *Benjamin Jowett
trans., 2009) (c. 380 B.C.E.).
2. Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV.
827, 835 (1988) (“Formal logic is not taught in law schools and not found in
judicial opinions, in briefs, or in law review articles.”).
3. Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be
Good Psychologists: Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 437, 437-439 (2008) (Observing that despite the
need for understanding the role of psychology in the practice of law “law
schools have tended to teach very little, directly, about how to be good with
people, and current critiques of legal education do not focus much on the
importance of psychological insights to attorneys.”)
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to persuade hearers to accept an advocate’s preferred
conclusion. Logic and psychology would seem natural—even
essential—topics of study for one seeking to craft logical
arguments and effectively deploy such arguments to the
psychological predispositions of a judge or jury. Of course, the
art and science of persuasion are not unique to the legal
profession. Many who choose other vocations—journalists,
physicians, drill sergeants, or financial planners—might find
themselves having to communicate, diagnose, motivate, advise,
or educate. All of these tasks involve some level of argument.
Preachers, politicians, and salespeople are required more
specifically to make arguments in their vocations, since they
evangelize, debate, or market, so they also may benefit from
more formal training in the theory and technique of
persuasion. However, most would concede that lawyers are
more regularly and specifically engaged in delivering
arguments than any of these other professions.
No vocation in society offers an experience quite like that
of a lawyer, who, on the first day of a trial, neatly arranges his
stack of exhibits in his banker’s boxes, reviews his opening
statement, and watches twelve men and women—who know
nothing about him, his client, his case, his motivation, his
intentions, his plan, his worldview, his likes or dislikes—take
their seats in the jury box. They are unfamiliar with his client,
and may wonder why his client keeps looking at the woman
sitting in the back of the courtroom, or what his client is
writing on her yellow pad of paper. They are unfamiliar with
the details of the case, beyond the limited facts revealed during
voir dire. Similarly, they are equally unfamiliar with opposing
counsel or her client. Instead, they sit in the jury box,
distracted by thoughts of what is going on at home or at work.
They are distracted by thoughts of whether they will get a
lunch break, or whether they will get to ask questions of the
witnesses or the lawyers. They wonder if they should raise a
hand if they need to use the restroom. They look around
wondering if the cameras behind the judge’s bench are on. They
wonder what is going to happen next. They wonder who will
speak first and what he or she will say. They wonder if they
will agree with the plaintiff or the defendant, or neither.
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It is all very strange for everyone involved. However,
resolving the strangeness and “making sense of it all” is an
important part of litigation.4 In the end, whether the lawyer
makes an effective argument regarding the disputed facts and
law will depend—in the most abstract terms—on the two
things that will likely answer the unspoken questions and
confusion of the people in the courtroom: the convincing logic of
the argument the lawyer presents and the jurors’ psychological
response to the logical integrity of that argument. If the
lawyer’s success or failure is a function of these two
components, logic and psychology, it seems even stranger that
lawyers receive no specific training in formal logic or
psychology.5
4. See Terry Lunsford & Beth Bonora, How Jurors Respond to Complex
Commercial Cases, 98 GLASSER LEGAL WORKS 345, 348 (1998) (“[J]urors
typically argue with each other over what the lawyers and experts said, what
they meant, and what the implications are. Simulations and interviews
make it clear that jurors spend most of their time arguing about the
evidence—not the attorney's good looks or the witness's expensive tie. They
do notice the witness's tie, as they notice everything in the court, and try to
make sense of it. Some studies suggest that ‘extra-legal factors’ are more
influential when evidence in the case is closely balanced. But jurors spend
most of their time and energy discussing the witnesses' testimony, the
lawyers' arguments, the documents, and what it all means.”) (emphasis
added); Leonard Matheo & Lisa DeCaro, The Eleven Most Frequently-Asked
Questions About Courtroom Presentation and Performance, 10 PRAC.
LITIGATOR 17, 25 (1999) (“The theme of your case provides the jury with a
viewpoint from which to examine all the evidence presented throughout the
trial. It gives them something to keep repeating to themselves, to filter all the
facts through, and to quote in the deliberation room.”); Jeffery P. Robinson,
Opening Statements Become Opening Stories, 30 CHAMPION 18, 18 (2006)
(“When they are good, our opening statements become a psychological filter—
the evidence introduced at trial passes through it, filtering out information
that doesn't match the tune they have just heard in your opening statement,
and emphasizing the information that resonates with your story.”); Alan
Tuerkheimer, A Study in Juror Psychology: Making Up Minds Early and Not
Keeping Them Open, 54 FOR THE DEF. 12, 12 (2012) (“At the core, when
confronted with new, complex, and adversarial information, jurors need ways
to make sense of it all since they have limited, short-term memories, as we all
do.”).
5. See, e.g., Peggy Cooper Davis, Slay the Three-Headed Demon!, 43
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 619, 623 (2008) (“Clinical and simulation work
should guide students to think critically about the interplay of logic,
psychology, and culture in a world in which interpretation is motivated by
clients', lawyers', and judges' individual or institutional interests and
desires.”).
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As strange as all of this might be, there is another facet to
the dynamic of courtroom argument that involves the
relationship between logic and psychology. If lawyers are not
specifically trained in these two disciplines, they certainly are
not trained in the relationship between the two. Accordingly,
when a lawyer presents his carefully crafted argument in the
courtroom—even when his witnesses testify with credibility
and his message is communicated with eloquence and clarity—
there is still a substantial risk that the jury will reject the
argument. They will not reject it because they were skeptical of
the witnesses’ credibility. They will not reject the argument
because they found the lawyer confusing or ineloquent. They
will not reject the argument because they were distracted by
the lawyer’s client scribbling on her legal pad, the cameras in
the courtroom, the break schedule, or the lunch menu. Instead,
the jury may reject the argument because they were
psychologically predisposed to ignore something lawyers
frequently take for granted, the force of the argument’s logical
appeal.
Psychology teaches that logical argument, even when
carefully understood and crafted by the arguer, can be
misunderstood or ignored by readers or listeners.6 Moreover,

6. For example:
[S]yllogistic reasoning is prone to the “atmosphere effect,”
where the overall atmosphere constructed by the premises
in syllogisms influences participants’ responses. That is,
participants produce a generic response when given generic
premises, a universal response when given universal
premises, and an existential response with existential
premises. The data do not support this alternative.
Participants produce more generic responses when given a
universal first premise and a generic second premise than
when given a generic first premise and a universal second
premise, while the atmosphere effect would predict roughly
equivalent proportions of such responses. Moreover,
participants produce reliably fewer existential premises
when given an existential first and second premise than
when given any other type of second premise. The
atmosphere effect has been unable to account for other
phenomena in syllogistic reasoning, and is similarly unable
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because of their psychological dispositions, readers and
listeners sometimes accept arguments as persuasive even when
those arguments are, incontrovertibly, logically invalid.7
Readers and listeners are sometimes predisposed to accept
arguments they read and hear simply because they take
certain logical forms, even when those forms are
incontrovertibly illogical and cannot support their purported
conclusion.8 If psychological science has suggested that people
are psychologically predisposed to accept arguments that have
logically invalid forms, then it seems that lawyers should be
particularly attentive to logical form. They should at least
learn what logical form is. They should, at a minimum, arm

to explain the results here.
Sangeet Khemlani et al., Syllogistic Reasoning with Generic Premises: The
Generic Overgeneralization Effect, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 20TH ANNUAL
CONFERENCE OF THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE SOCIETY 4 (2008) (citations omitted);
see also DEBORAH J. BENNETT, LOGIC MADE EASY; HOW TO KNOW WHEN
LANGUAGE DECEIVES YOU 88 (2004). Psychologists have argued “if two
premises are of the same logical form . . . then ‘atmosphere’ makes it likely
that a conclusion of that form will be thought to follow.” N.E. Wetherick &
K.J. Gilhooly, ‘Atmosphere’, Matching, and Logic in Syllogistic Reasoning, 14
CURRENT PSYCHOL. 169, 170 (1995). However, if the premises are of different
logical forms, two supplementary principles are required: (1) the Principle of
Quality, which states that “whenever one or more of the premises is negative
the preferred conclusion will be negative” and (2) the Principle of Quantity,
which states that “whenever one or more of the premises is particular, the
preferred conclusion will be particular.” JONATHAN ST.B. T. EVANS ET AL.,
HUMAN REASONING: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DEDUCTION 235 (1993). An individual
who has some grasp of logic often comes to think of the Atmosphere Effect as
a shortcut to giving a correct response because it is often successful. Id. But it
is not a sure-fire way to successfully conclude a syllogism. Id. In many
studies, there is evidence of an attempt at logical processing. Id. at 236.
Because the effects of atmosphere were more marked as invalid than valid
syllogisms, there is a finding based on the assumption that the subjects are
at least making an attempt at reasoning. Id. “The atmosphere of the premises
has been shown to be a contributing factor to difficulties in syllogistic
deduction . . . .” BENNETT, supra, note 6, at 88. While a complete survey of
this area of psychology is beyond the scope of this Article, knowing that our
psychology sometimes works against our ability to think logically should lead
those committed to the discipline of legal reasoning to be that much more
vigilant in understanding the logical form of the arguments we employ and
refute.
7. See supra note 6.
8. See supra note 6.
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themselves with the capacity to recognize logically invalid
arguments, lest they too find themselves (or their audience)
accepting a false argument due to psychological predisposition,
rather than reasoned examination.
Psychology reveals that the logic problem with argument is
that recipients of arguments make logical mistakes, ignore
logic altogether,9 or actually prefer certain illogical argument
patterns.10 They make these mistakes, in part, because they
employ “superficial heuristics.” Superficial heuristics are
strategies people use based on the cues of an argument (often
trivial in nature) that hint at the conclusions.11 People rely on
these cues, manifested in the superficial, but incomplete details
of an argument, like the phrasing of certain terms in the
argument or the predictable elements of the argument.12 It is
9. See Jonathan J. Koehler, Train Our Jurors, in HEURISTICS AND THE
LAW 303-04 (G. Gigerenzer & C. Engel eds., 2006) (“Research in psychology
with mock jurors, as well as anecdotal observation of actual jurors, suggests
that jury verdicts may also reflect systematic biases that arise from the
mental shortcuts—some of which may qualify as heuristics—that jurors use
when trying to apply the relevant rules of law and logic to a target case.”)
(footnote omitted).
10. See Daniel Heussen et al., Raising Argument Strength Using
Negative Evidence: A Constraint on Models of Induction, 39 MEMORY &
COGNITION 1497, 1498 (2011).
11. Bradley J. Morris & Christian D. Schunn, Rethinking Logical
Reasoning Skills from A Strategy Perspective, in METHODS OF THOUGHT:
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN REASONING STRATEGIES 31, 38 (Maxwell J. Roberts
& Elizabeth J. Newton eds., 2005) (“Superficial heuristics are selective
processing strategies in which solutions are derived from surface details,
such as terms or common elements, rather than on content (as in knowledgebased heuristics). Two well-known examples lead to matching biases and
atmosphere effects. Superficial heuristics lead to selective processing, but
differ from all previous strategies in that the focus is on the presence of
surface elements; no specific content is accessed. They operate as follows: (1)
surface structure is encoded; (2) key elements are identified; [and] (3) rules
applied to them. For example, in the Wason selection task, subjects prefer to
choose cards named in the rules rather than cards that are not named. Given
‘If there is an odd number on one side, then there is a vowel on the other side’
the subject may focus on ‘odd number’ and ‘vowel’ as key elements. Then,
when searching possible solutions, the subject will attend to those states that
contain the key elements. Hence, a card with an odd number and a card with
a vowel are selected because these match the elements in the rule. A similar
processing model applies to the heuristics that lead to atmosphere effects.”)
(citations omitted).
12. For example, one particular kind of heuristic is discussed in Jeffery
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J. Rachlinski, Heuristics, Biases, and Philosophy, 43 TULSA L. REV. 865, 86869 (2008):
Tversky and Kahneman presented people with a description
of Linda:
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She
majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply
concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice,
and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.
[Which is more probable?]
...
[1.] Linda is a bank teller.
[2.] Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist
movement.
Deductive logic dictates that it must be more likely that
Linda is a bank teller than that Linda is both a bank teller
and active in the feminist movement because the latter is a
subset of the former. And yet, most people presented with
this question conclude that it more likely she is both a bank
teller and active in the feminist movement.
Just as departures from perfect memory allow researchers
to make inferences about how the mnemonic system works,
this departure from rational choice allows for an inference
as to how people make judgments of this type. Tversky and
Kahneman argued that this problem represents an example
of how judgment departs from the ideal of rational choice.
People rely on the feeling that Linda seems like she would
be active in the feminist movement in making the judgment.
The judgment, however, is not one that calls for a reliance
on intuition; it is best made by the application of deductive
logic. But Tversky and Kahneman show that people seem to
rely on their feelings rather than logic. And in this case,
their feelings lead them astray. They rely on what Tversky
and Kahneman called the “representativeness heuristic,”
which is founding probabilistic judgments on the apparent
similarity between an instance and the general category,
rather than on deductive logic.
(footnotes omitted) (citing Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of
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important to note that people rely on these heuristic cues
rather than completely analyzing the entire form or content of
the argument. Some heuristics can be important, helpful tools
for legal decision making, since a comprehensive deductive
process is frequently impracticable.13 However, they can also be
problematic, causing legal decision-makers to abandon legal
principles and careful logic in reaching legal decisions.14
Accordingly, an important component of the legal process
should be ensuring control over superficial heuristics.15
and by Representation, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND
BIASES 84, 92, 97 (1982); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment and
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124, 1124-25 (1974)); see also
Timothy L. Hubbard, Logic and Reasoning, in 3 SALEM HEALTH: PSYCHOL. &
MENTAL HEALTH 1121, 1124 (Nancy A. Piotrowski ed., 2010).
13. See, e.g., Callia Piperides et al., Group Report: What is the Role of
Heuristics in Litigation?, in HEURISITCS AND THE LAW, supra note 9, at 343,
371 (“[C]ognitive psychological theory and research indicates that as humans,
individual legal decision makers have limited cognitive abilities, such as
limited memory, attention, and processing capacity. These limitations are
magnified in legal environments where legal decision makers often have to
interpret complex laws, understand a lot of conflicting evidence, and work
under time pressure. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that under
these conditions, they will rely on simple heuristics to make decisions rather
than perform complicated calculations.”).
14. See, e.g., Hal R. Arkes & Victoria A. Shaffer, Should We Use Decision
Aids or Gut Feelings?, in HEURISTICS AND THE LAW, supra note 9, at 411, 41213; see also Koehler, supra note 9, at 303-04 (“Research in psychology with
mock jurors, as well as anecdotal observations of actual jurors, suggests that
jury verdicts may also reflect systematic biases that arise from the mental
shortcuts—some of which may qualify as heuristics—that jurors use when
trying to apply the relevant rules of law and logic to a target case.”) (footnote
omitted). Dr. Koehler even goes so far as to suggest that jurors be trained to
“employ elementary rules of logic and inference to make sense of the evidence
and arguments that come before them.” Koehler, supra note 9, at 313.
15 See Reid Hastie & Bernd Wittenbrink, Heuristics for Applying Laws to
Facts, in HEURISTICS AND THE LAW, supra note 9, at 259, 275-76 (“American
legal decisions occur within a context in which procedures are in place,
specifically designed to make the decision process deliberative and controlled.
For example, jurors are repeatedly admonished not to rely on intuitive
judgment habits or to use cues such as the defendant’s race. They are
prevented from hearing relevant (perhaps ‘best cue’) evidence such as
information about a defendant’s record of past crimes. They are given careful
instructions on presumptions and standards of proof. They are even given
instructions on some inferences they should and should not draw. And,
finally, they are instructed to consider alternative views on the verdict and
group decision rules (e.g., super-majority and unanimity requirements) force
them to pay special heed to unpopular views. All of these conditions are
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One method of controlling superficial heuristics is
emphasizing the important role of logical form in legal
argument.16 If legal reasoning is to be a discipline, distinct from
ordinary processes of decision-making and valued by society,
then legal reasoning must be grounded in the integrity of
logical form. If legal reasoning is to be grounded in logic, then
lawyers must understand sound logical form and how it is
applied in legal argument. One tool of philosophical logic is the
logical fallacy. This Article will generally describe philosophical
logic, logical form, and logical fallacy. Further, it will explain
one specific logical fallacy—the Fallacy of Negative Premises—
as well as how courts have used the Fallacy of Negative
Premises to evaluate legal arguments. Last, it will explain how
lawyers, judges, and law students can use the Fallacy of
Negative Premises to make and evaluate legal argument.
II. Philosophical Logic, Logical Fallacies, and Why
Understanding Logical Form is Essential to the Discipline of
Legal Reasoning
A. The Role of Logical Form in Reasoning
Discussion of the philosophy of logic, logical form,
syllogisms, or logical fallacies only rarely appears in legal
arguments, briefs, or opinions. Logic has, in many circles,
fallen on hard times.17 The role of formal logic in contemporary
aimed to reduce legal decision makers’ reliance on solely heuristic judgment
habits. But, of course, none of these measures are guaranteed to prevent fast
and frugal decisions.”).
16. See, e.g., Koehler, supra note 9, at 310 (“[J]urors should not be free to
reason according to their own unique brands of logic to obtain a desired result
. . . . [P]rospective jurors who broadly fail to understand and accept the rules
of logic and probability theory when applied to everyday matters have
questionable reasoning skills. Because evidence presented at trial is
increasingly complex and statistical in character (Feinberg 1989), the system
should impose minimal standards to ensure that our legal fact finders are up
to the task.”).
17. For one perspective on the diminished role of logic in legal reasoning,
see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96
YALE L.J. 943, 955-57 (1987) (describing historical perspectives on the role of
logic in jurisprudence from Oliver Wendell Holmes’s admonition to “think
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society stands in sharp contrast to its role in history. One
example is early Puritan New England, where formal logic was
of significant importance. The Puritans were a devoutly
religious group that stressed the importance of a rational
religion, viewing logic as important to addressing the religious
issues of their time, and a topic to be studied, “even in one’s
leisure.”18 The role of logic in Puritan culture had an impact on
early American higher education. For example, the curriculum
at Harvard College during the late seventeenth century reveals
the importance of logic in higher education and the influence of
the Puritan emphasis on philosophies of logic.19 The influence
of the study of formal logic extended beyond Harvard College,
and certain philosophies of logic were adopted by many
preachers and educational leaders in colonial New England.20
The importance of logic in these New England
communities in the late seventeenth century provides a stark
contrast to the role formal logic plays in modern times. Logic
things[,] not words . . .” to the “rule skepticism” of the Legal Realist school
and the view that legal decisions were based “on judges' ‘hunches,’ personal
political views, or psychological dispositions” to Cardozo’s declaration that
“[n]othing is stable. Nothing absolute. All is fluid and changeable. There is an
endless becoming.”) (footnotes omitted) (quotation marks omitted).
18. RICK KENNEDY, ARISTOTELIAN & CARTESIAN LOGIC AT HARVARD 6
(1995) (“[L]ogic in the seventeenth century was meant to be used constantly
and consciously as the technology of rational living. Logic was not simply a
discipline set aside in the corner of one’s education . . . . Textbooks and
manuals of logic in the seventeenth century were not arcane; they were
designed to be useful and read even in one’s leisure.”).
19. During the late seventeenth century, perhaps the most influential
tutor at Harvard was the Puritan pastor and scholar William Brattle. See
RICK KENNEDY, A HISTORY OF REASONABLENESS: TESTIMONY AND AUTHORITY IN
THE ART OF THINKING 217 (2004) (noting that in the late seventeenth century
Harvard did not have professors, but instead used tutors who were “assigned
a small group of students to whom [each tutor] taught all subjects for four
years”). The influence of Brattle’s philosophy of logic was far-reaching and
served to enforce the ideals of traditional Puritanism even after his death in
1723. See KENNEDY, supra note 18, at 96. Brattle’s logic was religiously
oriented and served the role of merging the instruction of logic with the
instruction of divinity. See id. at 108. Brattle’s logic textbook became the
most popular textbook at Harvard from 1687 until at least 1743, and possibly
as late as 1767. Id. at 96.
20. See DOUGLAS MCKNIGHT, SCHOOLING, THE PURITAN IMPERATIVE, AND
THE MOLDING OF AN AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY: EDUCATION’S “ERRAND INTO
THE WILDERNESS” 54 (2003).
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books do not make the New York Times best-seller list; formal
logic is not a core subject of undergraduate education, and
formal logic, as such, is rarely taught in law schools.21 Further,
in the same way developments in the role of formal logic
affected education in colonial America and beyond, the
diminished role of formal logic in modern jurisprudence has
had no small impact on contemporary American jurisprudence:
Following Holmes and Dewey (and indeed also
like Holmes, though, to be sure, much less like
Dewey) many generations of jurists (especially
the academic phalanx) have given no serious
attention to the role of logic in legal argument,
while at the same time, by word or by deed,
dismissing it as a serious subject for teaching
and analysis in law school. I suggest that this
more or less universal dismissal has had the
pernicious “trickle up” effect of dulling the
precision and clarity and perspicacity of legal
arguments offered by judges and lawyers, from
those penned and printed by state court judges
and lawyers to those issued by the United States
Supreme Court . . . . Generations of postHolmesian legal academics and their students
(many of whom have gone on to become lawyers
and judges) have acquired the view, almost as an
intellectual knee-jerk reflex, that deductive logic
has very little useful role to play in legal
argument. After all, no post-Holmesian postrealist denies that a very great part of the law
involves argument. But if “the life of the law” is
not logic but at the same time does inescapably
involve a great deal of argument, then mustn’t
we conclude that “logic” has very little to do with,
or anyway little of significance to do with legal
argument? 22
21. See Posner, supra note 2, as 835.
22. Scott Brewer, On the Possibility of Necessity in Legal Argument: A
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Nevertheless, logic continues to persevere, finding favor
with judges interested in putting the power of logical form to
work.23 One would be surprised to hear a judge admit to being
convinced by an argument that is patently illogical. Few
lawyers will advance such arguments, and few jurors will
consciously accept them. Accordingly, having an understanding
of formal logic can aid law students, lawyers, and judges in
understanding the law, learning the law, solving legal
problems, and making persuasive legal argument.24
B. Defining Logical Form and Understanding Its Role in
Advocacy
Formal logic has been described in various ways.25 One fair

Dilemma for Holmes and Dewey, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 9, 11, 25 (2000); see
also id. at 47 (concluding “logic, including but not limited to deductive
inference, is deeply and importantly relevant to legal argument and to the
legal practices that are to a great extent comprised of or at least reliant on
legal argument”).
23. See, e.g., infra notes 76-79 (collecting opinions utilizing formal logic
as part of the legal reasoning process).
24. See, e.g., Brewer, supra note 22, at 11 (“[W]hile I do not believe that
logic is the most important discipline a jurist (teacher, student, judge,
scholar) should have, I do believe that it is a discipline whose competent
mastery is vital for any jurist. In that way, Holmes’ and Dewey’s influence in
this area should be regarded as pernicious.”); see also Ruggero J. Aldisert et
al., Logic for Law Students: How to Think Like a Lawyer, 69 U. PITT. L. REV.
1, 2 (2007) (“First, all prospective lawyers should make themselves intimately
familiar with the fundamentals of deductive reasoning. Deductive reasoning,
as Aristotle taught long ago, is based on the act of proving a conclusion by
means of two other propositions. Perhaps 90 percent of legal issues can be
resolved by deduction, so the importance of understanding this type of
reasoning cannot be overstated.”).
25. One description for formal logic is the “architecture of argument.”
See generally James C. Raymond, The Architecture of Argument, 7 JUD. REV.:
J. JUD. COMM’N NEW S. WALES 39 (2004). See also MADHUCCHANDA SEN, AN
INTRODUCTION TO CRITICAL THINKING 25 (2010) (“Logic can be described as the
systematic study of inferences. The British empiricist philosopher John Locke
once said, ‘Logic is the anatomy of thought’. Formal logic is the study of the
form of inferences or arguments, which enables us to judge whether an
argument has a form that has been recognized as a form of proper inference,
wherein the conclusion is derived from the premises following certain
accepted rules or methods of inference.”). Philosophers have defined logic in
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description is the philosophical study of proper inference.26 In
argument generally, and in legal argument specifically, one
party claims that his preferred conclusion is the proper
inference to make from the law and the facts. Argument is an
effort to justify a conclusion based on inference.27 In deductive
argument, particularly, the arguer uses advocated, accepted,
assumed, or undeniable premises as the starting point for the
argument.28 From these premises, or from the relationship
various ways, have debated what logic is, and described what makes logic
“formal” or “informal.” For example, it has been said “[l]ogic, in its most
extensive sense in which it has been thought advisable to employ the name,
may be considered as the Science, and also as the Art, of Reasoning.”
RICHARD WHATELY, ELEMENTS OF LOGIC 1 (1858). See also J. LACY O’BYRNE
CROKE, LOGIC 3 (1906) (“Pure or Formal Logic is the science of the necessary
laws of thought. It has thought rather than language for its adequate objectmatter; for though it must express itself in language, and is very much
concerned with it, language comes in only as the minister of thought. It is a
science;—a science rather than an art.”) (footnote omitted); W. R. BOYCE
GIBSON, THE PROBLEM OF LOGIC 157 (1908) (“. . . Formal Logic is a
propaedeutic which is abstractly concerned with consistency of reasoning
without any reference to the truth or the falsehood of the accepted premises,
or to the knowledge or the ignorance of the reasoner.”). “[F]ormal logic[] is
devoted to thought in general and those universal forms and principles of
thought which hold good everywhere, both in judging of reality and in
weighing possibility, irrespective of any difference in the objects.” HERMANN
LOTZE, 1 LOGIC IN THREE BOOKS OF THOUGHT, OF INVESTIGATION AND OF
KNOWLEDGE 10-11 (Bernard Bosanquet trans., Clarendon Press 1888).
26. See PATRICK J. HURLEY, A CONCISE INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 31 (9th
ed, 2006) (“A deductive argument is an argument in which the arguer claims
that it is impossible for the conclusion to be false given that the premises are
true.”) (emphasis omitted); see also WILLIAM J. KILGORE, AN INTRODUCTORY
LOGIC 509 (2d ed. 1979) (“Deductive logic . . . is the analysis of arguments
whose form requires that in all cases in which the conclusion is false at least
one premise also is false.”) (emphasis omitted). In the context of legal proof it
has been said that “[i]nference is the essence of proof; proof is good or bad
according to the quality and number of inferences drawn from facts to
conclusions.” J.S. COVINGTON, JR., THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ARGUMENT AND
PROOF: CASES, MATERIALS, AND ANALYSES 2 (2d ed. 2006).
27. DOUGLAS WALTON, ONE-SIDED ARGUMENTS: A DIALECTICAL ANALYSIS
OF BIAS 28 (1999) (“[A]n argument is defined as a sequence of reasoning, a
network of propositions in which some propositions, functioning as
conclusions, are inferred from others, functioning as premises by means of
inferences.”) (emphasis omitted). See also WILLIAM T. PARRY & EDWARD A.
HACKER, ARISTOTELIAN LOGIC 5 (1991) (“An argument is a sequence of
propositions that offers one or more propositions in the sequence as grounds
or evidence for another proposition in the sequence.”) (emphasis omitted).
28. Lawyers frequently argue regarding the truth of premises that fall
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between two premises, the arguer seeks to reach a conclusion.
The conclusion is not accepted solely because the premises are
true; rather, the conclusion is accepted only because the
premises are true and because the relationship between and
among the premises and conclusion require that the conclusion
be true.29 The conclusion is compelled by the premises only
when the logical form of the argument requires that the
conclusion be inferred from the premises.30 Such an inference is
proper only when the form of the argument comports with six
simple rules of formal logic.31
Logicians describe this relationship between the premises
and conclusion in terms of formal logic. Formal logic requires
that, for a moment, one set aside the truth or falsity of the
premises and focus instead on the logical form of the argument,
to first discern whether if the premises are true, the conclusion
must be true.32 This narrow focus on the logical form of an
argument presents an important opportunity for a respondent,
who may be restrained by stipulated, advocated, or presumed
into the “advocated” category. However, legal argument is not always made
in the context of disputed facts. For example, when parties stipulate to facts,
when facts are admitted in pleadings or discovery, or where presumptions
require that certain facts be accepted as true, the lawyers turn their advocacy
skills away from arguing the facts that make up the argument’s premises and
toward arguing the proper relationship and logical inference between and
among the relevant premises.
29. See JEROME E. BICKENBACH & JACQUELINE M. DAVIES, GOOD REASONS
FOR BETTER ARGUMENTS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SKILLS AND VALUES OF
CRITICAL THINKING 237 (1997) (“When an argument is valid, if its premises
are true then its conclusion must (necessarily) be true.”); TRUDY GOVIER, A
PRACTICAL STUDY OF ARGUMENT 108 (2010) (“In formal logic, a sound
argument is one in which all the premises are true and they provide logically
conclusive support for the conclusion because they deductively entail it.”);
HURLEY, supra note 26, at 43 (noting that “validity is something that is
determined by the relationship between premises and conclusion” and further
that “[t]he question is not whether the premises and conclusion are true and
false, but whether the premises support the conclusion.”); see also sources
cited supra note 26.
30. See supra note 29.
31. See IRVING M. COPI & CARL COHEN, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 224 (13th
ed. 2009).
32. This presents an opportunity for the respondent, restrained by
advocated, accepted, assumed, or undeniable premises, to still salvage a
viable argument, not based in the law or the facts, but instead, based on the
logical form of the argument the respondent is faced with.
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fact or other undeniable premises to still make a convincing
argument. This argument would be one that rests not on the
facts, or the law, but on the logical form of the argument faced
by the respondent. In large part, this process is a function of
two simple steps. First, it requires that arguments, which are
normally articulated in nonstandard, casual, or even colloquial
form,33 be arranged in a standardized, simplified form that
allows us to distinguish the terms that are the subject of each
premise, their relationship to one another, and their
relationship to the conclusion. This standardized34 form is
called a syllogism35: an argumentative structure made up of
two distinct (but related) premises and a conclusion.36 There
are three principal kinds of syllogisms: the categorical
syllogism, the disjunctive syllogism, and the hypothetical
syllogism.37 The disjunctive syllogism “contain[s] a compound,
disjunctive (or alternative) premise asserting the truth of at
least one of two alternatives, and a premise that asserts the
falsity of one of those alternatives.”38 The hypothetical
syllogism contains “one or more compound, hypothetical (or
conditional) propositions, affirming that if one of its
components (the antecedent) is true then the other of its
components (the consequent) is true.”39 Since legal analysis

33. See COPI & COHEN, supra note 31, at 267 (“In ordinary discourse the
arguments we encounter rarely appear as neatly packaged, standard-form
categorical syllogisms. So the syllogistic arguments that arise in everyday
speech cannot always be readily tested. They can be tested, however, if we
put them into standard form—and we can generally do that by reformulating
their constituent propositions. The term syllogistic argument refers to any
argument that either is a standard-form categorical syllogism or that can be
reformulated as a standard-form categorical syllogism without any loss or
change of meaning.”).
34. “Now, to put an argument in syllogistic form is to strip it bare for
logical inspection. We can then see where its weak points must lie, if it has
any, and consider whether there is reason to believe that it is actually (i.e.
materially) weak at those points.” F.C.S. SCHILLER, FORMAL LOGIC: A
SCIENTIFIC AND SOCIAL PROBLEM 222 (1912).
35. See id.
36. See ALEXANDER BAIN, LOGIC: DEDUCTIVE AND INDUCTIVE 134
(American Book Company 1841).
37. See COPI & COHEN, supra note 31, at 301.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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frequently involves placing legal labels on status or conduct,
requiring categorization, many legal arguments fit neatly into
a categorical syllogism. Accordingly, throughout this Article,
“syllogism” will refer to a categorical syllogism.40
Second, it requires that we test the form of this standard
arrangement of premises and conclusion against a series of
simple rules. These rules have been referred to as the rules of
logic. The six41 rules of logic that apply to a categorical
syllogism have been typically stated as follows: (a) avoid four
terms (i.e., a categorical syllogism must contain three terms,42
and the terms must have the same meaning each time they are
used in the argument);43 (b) distribute44 the middle term45 in at

40. However, other syllogistic forms have useful roles in legal argument.
41. While these six rules are generally accepted in contemporary
philosophy, not all logicians have agreed on the number of rules, or their
precise formulation. Aristotle developed a set of six rules to check the validity
of syllogisms. See Peter King & Stewart Shapiro, The History of Logic, in THE
OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 496 (Ted Honderich ed., 1995). Richard
Whately, a nineteenth century logician and theologian, also listed these six
rules for the validity of syllogisms in his work Elements of Logic. See, e.g.,
C.L. HAMBLIN, FALLACIES 196 (1970). Whately’s six rules were deduced from
an original twelve rules written in Latin by Henry Aldrich, a seventeenth
century logician, who had expanded on Aristotle’s six original rules. See
id. Logician C.L. Hamblin, suggested eliminating the first two rules since
they merely define what a syllogism is, independent of the validity of a
syllogism. Id. at 199. He also suggested combining rules five and six because
they do not operate independently from each other. Id. These two rules can be
joined to state “[t]here is an affirmative conclusion, a negative conclusion or
no conclusion at all according as both premises are affirmative, or only one, or
neither.” Id. Therefore, Hamblin uses only rules three, four, and the
combined five and six to provide a satisfactory theory of the validity for
syllogisms. Id.; see also HURLEY, supra note 26, at 256 (articulating five rules
but noting “logicians of today generally settle on five or six [rules of
syllogism]”) (footnote omitted). Hurley explains the distinction between five
and six rules by stating, “[s]ome texts include a rule stating that the three
terms of a categorical syllogism must be used in the same sense throughout
the argument.” HURLEY, supra note 26, at 256 n.*. Hurley and others
incorporate this rule into the definition of “categorical syllogism.” Id.
42. In syllogistic logic, a “term” is a class of things that is the subject of a
proposition. See B.P. BAIRAN, AN INTRODUCTION TO SYLLOGISTIC LOGIC 283
(2005).
43. See COPI & COHEN, supra note 31, at 244 (“A valid standard-form
categorical syllogism must contain exactly three terms, each of which is used
in the same sense throughout the argument.”).
44. In logic, when a term is used in a way that “refers to all of the
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least one premise (a discussion of the logical term “distribute”
follows); (c) any term distributed in the conclusion must be
distributed in the premises; (d) avoid two negative premises; (e)
if either premise is negative, the conclusion must be negative;
and (f) from two universal premises no particular conclusion
may be drawn.46
Understanding all of the rules of formal logic is a
significant undertaking. It is ordinarily impractical for a busy
lawyer to digest the long history of philosophical logic.
Similarly, expecting lawyers to take time away from their
practices to master the nuances of formal deductive logic, or
even the intricacies of each of these rules of logic, might be
unrealistic. Fortunately, extensive efforts are not necessary to
realize practical value from these rules of logic. An
understanding of even one of these six rules can be an
important tool for a law student, lawyer, or judge. An
argument that violates just one of these rules fails in its logical
integrity and cannot support its conclusion.47 When the
argument violates a rule of logic, it is labeled as committing a

members of the class” referenced by that term, that term is said to be
distributed. COPI & COHEN, supra note 31, at 245; see also NICHOLAS BUNNIN
& JIYUAN YU, THE BLACKWELL DICTIONARY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 188 (
2004) (“A term is distributed if it refers to all members of the class to which it
is referring and is explicitly or implicitly prefixed by a universal quantifier.”)
(emphasis omitted); CHRISTOPHER W. TINDALE, FALLACIES AND ARGUMENT
APPRAISAL 45 (2007) (“A term is said to be ‘distributed’ in a proposition when
it is meant to refer to all members of the class of things that proposition
denotes.”); WHATELY, supra note 25, at 28 (noting that “a term is said to be
‘distributed,’ when it is taken universally, so as to stand for everything it is
capable of being applied to . . .”); JAMES A. WINANS & WILLIAM E. UTTERBACK,
ARGUMENTATION 69 (1930) (“A term is said to be distributed if it refers to a
class of things in its entirety.”). Conversely, if a term only refers to a portion
of the members of the class, it is “undistributed.” WHATELY, supra note 25, at
28 (noting that “a term is said to be . . . ‘undistributed,’ when it stands for a
portion only of the things signified by it . . .”).
45. The term that appears in both premises, but not the conclusion, is
called the “middle term.” See COPI & COHEN, supra note 31, at 225.
46. See, e.g., COPI & COHEN, supra note 31, at 244-49. However, compare
Charles L. Hamblin’s discussion regarding historical variations on the rules
of validity of syllogisms and his proposal that three concise rules, rather than
six, could adequately encompass the requirements. See HAMBLIN, supra note
41, at 196-202.
47. COPI & COHEN, supra note 31, at 244.
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fallacy.48 Philosophy has developed a catalog of defective
argument structures that can be easily identified by their
argumentative patterns. These patterns, which manifest the
violation of a rule of logic, are hallmarks of fallacious
arguments. Accordingly, fallacy-based legal reasoning offers
lawyers a shortcut to mastering philosophic logic: By learning
to identify the patterns of argument, they obtain an important
tool for testing the logical integrity of legal reasoning.
C. The Logical Fallacy and Its Relationship to Logical Form
If a violation of a rule of logic is a hallmark of a logical
fallacy, then what is a logically fallacious legal argument, and
why is labeling such arguments “fallacious” significant? A
fallacy has been variously defined.49 However, most logicians

48. See id. Formal logical fallacies are the result of errors in the required
form of the argument. This is a contrast to informal fallacies, which are
errors in the use of language. Id. at 119 (“Informal fallacies . . . arise from
confusions concerning the content of the language used.”).
49. See Hans Vilhelm Hansen, The Straw Thing of Fallacy Theory: The
Standard Definition of ‘Fallacy’, 16 ARGUMENTATION 133 (2002), for a
thorough discussion of the historical meaning of “fallacy” throughout the
history of the philosophy of logic. Hansen considers a variety of definitions of
fallacy: “A fallacious argument, as almost every account from Aristotle
onwards tells you, is one that seems to be valid but is not so[,]” id. at 133
(quoting HAMBLIN, supra note 41, at 12); “errors in reasoning[,]” id. at 137
(quoting MORRIS R. COHEN & ERNEST NAGEL, AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC AND
SCIENTIFIC METHOD 376 (1934)); “any kind of mistaken belief, however
arrived at” generally or “an argument that seems to be sound without being
so in fact,” id. at 138 (quoting MAX BLACK, CRITICAL THINKING 229-30 (1952));
[s]ophistical reasoning appears to be genuine reasoning but
actually is fallacious. Sophistics, therefore, is that part of
logic concerned with the defective syllogism. A sophistic
argument is a syllogism that seems to infer a conclusion
from probable premises but, because of one fallacy or
another does not really do so. The defect in the argument
occurs either on the part of matter alone or on the part of
both matter and form[,]
id. at 138 (quoting JOHN A. OESTERLE, LOGIC: THE ART OF DEFINING AND
REASONING 253 (2d ed. 1963)); “[s]trictly speaking, the term ‘fallacy’
designates an unacceptable mode of reasoning. However, the term is usually
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agree that an argument is formally fallacious when it violates a
rule of logic.50 If it violates a rule of logic, the argument’s
logical form cannot be relied upon to ensure the truth of the
conclusion51—and if that is the case, there is no reason to
accept the argument’s purported inference (i.e., that the
conclusion is necessarily inferred from the premise).
Understanding the relationship between the rules of logic
and the important claim of deductive logic tells us something
about why this label of “fallacy” is so important. Deductive
argument is an important52 and common form of legal
extended to include types of improper definition[,]” id. at 139 (quoting EDITH
WATSON SCHIPPER & EDWARD SCHUH, A FIRST COURSE IN MODERN LOGIC 24
(1959)) (internal quotation marks omitted); “any mistaken idea or false belief,
like the ‘fallacy’ of believing that all men are honest. But logicians use the
term in the narrower sense of an error in reasoning or in argument. A fallacy,
as we shall use the term, is a type of incorrect argument[,]” id. at 139
(quoting IRVING M. COPI, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 52 (2d ed. 1961));
a synonym for any kind of position that is false or deceptive,
and sometimes it is applied in a more narrow sense to a
faulty process of reasoning or to tricky or specious
persuasion [or] . . . a discussion [that] claims to conform to
the rules of sound arguments but, in fact, fails to do so[,]
id. at 141 (quoting WARD FEARNSIDE &WILLIAM HOLTHER, FALLACY: THE
COUNTERFEIT OF ARGUMENT 3 (1959)); or “[a] fallacious argument in logic is an
incorrect argument. It is also customary to restrict the word ‘fallacious’ to
incorrect arguments which in certain contexts seem to some to be correct.” Id.
at 141 (quoting JAMES D. CARNEY & RICHARD K. SCHEER, FUNDAMENTALS OF
LOGIC 11 (2d ed. 1974)).
50. See, e.g., COPI & COHEN, supra note 31, at 244.
51. See, e.g., id. at 244-49.
52. Of course, there are other forms of legal argument. Deductive
reasoning can be contrasted with inductive reasoning. Inductive reasoning
involves an argument that claims its conclusion is supported by its premises,
but not necessarily required by them. When reasoning inductively, the arguer
reasons from specific examples to support a claim that the specific represents
a more general principle. See COPI & COHEN, supra note 31, at 26-28 (noting
that “[i]nductive arguments make weaker claims than those made by
deductive arguments”). Another common form or reasoning in legal argument
is reasoning by analogy, a form of inductive reasoning. Analogy has been
contrasted with deductive argument by one commentator this way:
While analogies are thus useful in legal reasoning, they play
a more limited role in legal argument. The obvious
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reasoning.53 It is an argument that reasons that if the premises
of the argument are true, the conclusion must be true.54 If an
argument is deductively valid, then it is airtight as long as the
premises are true.55 Accordingly, in cases in which a litigant
can operate from premises that are assumed, stipulated,
admitted, or presumed in the litigant’s favor (as they are, for
example, where the facts as pled are required to be considered
in the light most favorable to one litigant56), deductive
inadequacy of the use of analogy in constructing a legal
argument is an analogy’s inability to answer the question,
“so what”? . . . It takes a syllogism to provide the answer to
the “so what” challenge. That is, the logical force of an
analogy comes from the syllogism to which it contributes,
not from the persuasiveness of the analogy itself. Or, put
another way, an analogy is a way of defending a premise of
a syllogism; by itself, it is not an argument but merely a
small piece of an argument.
JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL ARGUMENT: THE STRUCTURE AND LANGUAGE OF
EFFECTIVE ADVOCACY 11 (1st ed. 1993).
53. See, e.g., Scott Brewer, Traversing Holmes’s Path Toward a
Jurisprudence of Logical Form, in THE PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE:
THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 94, 120 (Steven J. Burton ed.,
2000) (“Judges constantly rely on deductive inference in the course of making
and evaluating legal arguments. They often rely on it even in the course of
deploying other argument types, such as analogy and induction. They also
rely on it when applying authoritative rules about which there is no active
doubt about the meaning of a term or phrase that appears in the rule, nor
doubt about which, if any, authoritative rule applies.”).
54. See supra note 26.
55. ALAN HAUSMAN ET AL., LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY: A MODERN
INTRODUCTION 5 (11th ed. 2010) (“The fundamental logical property of a
deductively valid argument is this: If all its premises are true, then its
conclusion must be true. In other words, an argument is valid if it is
impossible for all its premises to be true and yet its conclusion be false. The
truth of the premises of a valid argument guarantees the truth of its
conclusion.”).
56. One example is a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. See, e.g., Butler v. Ford Motor Co.,
724 F. Supp. 2d 575, 578 (D.S.C. 2010) (“Accordingly, a [Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure] . . . 12(b) (6) motion should only be granted if, after accepting all
well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff's complaint as true and drawing all
reasonable factual inferences from those facts in the plaintiff's favor, it
appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of
his claim entitling him to relief.”) (citation omitted); see also F.T.C. v.
Innovative Mktg., Inc., 654 F. Supp. 2d 378, 384-85 (D. Md. 2009) (“When
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argument can be an important argumentative strategy. The
nature of deductive argument leverages the assumed,
admitted, or presumed facts or established legal rules to the
litigant’s maximum benefit; that is, where there is no basis for
controverting legal premises (as is the case, for example, with
facts that must be accepted in the light most favorable to one
party), the success of the argument can be made to depend on
the logical validity of the argument.
One of the benefits of fallacy-based legal analysis is that it
provides a framework for describing not only how the deductive
argument works, but how the deductive argument fails.57 Since
deductive arguments are vehicles for establishing a necessary
conclusion, they present a powerful tool for advocacy. However,
most lawyers are not trained in logic, so they are forced to
attack deductive arguments with the only tool in which they
are trained: raising doubts or disproving the truth of the
premises of the deductive arguments they face. While attacking
an argument’s premise is an important tool, relying exclusively
on this method ignores an equally important element of
deductive arguments: the argument’s logical form. Since the
validity of a deductive argument’s form is determined by its
strict adherence to the rules of logic, lawyers unfamiliar with
the rules frequently miss an opportunity to completely defuse
an argument’s reliability and persuasiveness.
reviewing such challenges, courts construe the pleading requirements
prescribed by [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] . . . 8 liberally and accept ‘all
well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint as true and draw[ ] all
reasonable factual inferences from those facts in the plaintiff's favor.’
Traditionally, reviewing judges have operated under the oft-stated mantra
that ‘a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of
his claim which would entitle him to relief.’”) (citations omitted). Another
example is a pleaded fact in the context of a default judgment. See, e.g.,
Massa v. Jiffy Prods. Co., 240 F.2d 702, 705 (9th Cir. 1957) (“This being a
default judgment, the allegations of the cross-complaint are taken as true.”).
57. See RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS: A GUIDE TO CLEAR
LEGAL THINKING 2 (3d ed. 1997) (“Too often judges—like lawyers, law
professors and law review writers—use the cop-out phrase, ‘flawed
reasoning.’ This trite phrase means nothing. It does not indicate whether the
criticism relates to the choice of a controlling legal precept, its interpretation,
its application of the facts or is a statement that a formal or material fallacy
is present.”).
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Another benefit of fallacy-based legal analysis is that
logical fallacies are an efficient methodology for explaining
what is wrong with a legal argument. While the fallacies
themselves are the work of centuries of philosophical analysis,
they are well-established, enduring principles, the explanations
and justification of which have been neatly encapsulated in a
few simple rules. Additionally, as will be discussed in more
detail below, these rules have been recognized by courts and
used to analyze and reject fallacious legal arguments.58
Accordingly, the logical fallacy is not only an effective tool,
but also an efficient one.
D. One Important Logical Fallacy: The Fallacy of Negative
Premise
If a legal argument violates even one rule, then the
argument is logically invalid, and cannot be relied upon to
ensure the truth of its conclusion.59 Accordingly, knowing just
one of the six rules of logic can help a lawyer recognize one
category of faulty reasoning, without having to master the
entirety of the philosophy of formal logic. This task is further
streamlined by the fact that where an argument violates a
particular rule of logic, it receives a proper name. This Article
focuses on the Fallacy of Negative Premises, which is the name
given to an argument that violates the fifth rule of formal logic:
“If either premise is negative, the conclusion must be
negative.”60
As discussed above, formal logic analyzes arguments in a
basic, uniform, familiar argumentative structure: the
syllogism. The syllogism is so natural to us that we rarely stop
to think about why we seem to naturally gravitate to its form,61

58. See discussion infra Part III.
59. See, e.g., COPI & COHEN, supra note 31, at 244-49.
60. Id. at 247. See also MICHAEL F. GOODMAN, FIRST LOGIC 76 (1993)
(noting that “if one premise in a categorical syllogism is Negative, then the
conclusion must also be Negative, for the syllogism to be valid”); HURLEY,
supra note 26, at 258 (“A negative premise requires a negative conclusion,
and a negative conclusion requires a negative premise.”).
61. See COPI & COHEN, supra note 31, at 224; see also ANTONIN SCALIA &
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or why it is so persuasive in legal argument.62 The syllogism is
a simple form of argument that consists of two premises and a
conclusion. Each premise is made up of two terms; the
conclusion is also made up of two terms. For example, if
someone told me that the judge who was about to hear his case
had never taken the bar exam, I might respond by saying: “All
lawyers must have taken and passed the bar exam. Judges are
lawyers. Therefore, all judges have passed the bar exam.” It
takes little work to organize this argument in the form of a
syllogism:
All lawyers are people who have passed the bar
examination.
All judges are lawyers.
Therefore, all judges are people who have passed the bar
examination.

BRYAN A. GARNER, MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING JUDGES 41
(2008) (“[P]ersuasion is possible only because all human beings are born with
a capacity for logical thought. It is something we all have in common . . . . If
you have never studied logic, you may be surprised to learn—like the man
who was astounded to discover that he had been speaking prose all his life—
that you have been using syllogistic reasoning all along.”).
62. Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner suggest that lawyers
“think syllogistically” and observe that “[t]he most rigorous form of logic, and
hence the most persuasive, is [the basic form of formal logical analysis called]
the syllogism.” SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 61, at 41; see also COVINGTON,
supra note 26, at 199 (“The enticing thing about the syllogism is that it yields
a necessary conclusion, which means that if the listener accepts the premises,
then the listener must accept the conclusion or contradict himself. The early
European intellectual prized the power of the syllogism to the point that
much of medieval university training was about intricate points in
disputation based on the syllogism.”); GARDNER, supra note 52, at 8 (“The
power of syllogistic argument leads to the only significant rule about crafting
legal arguments: every good legal argument is cast in the form of a
syllogism.”). Courts have long recognized the syllogism as a legitimate and
persuasive form of legal argument. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 511 (1996); Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 421 (1991);
Fort Stewart Sch. v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 495 U.S. 641, 650 (1990);
Ry. Express Agency v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434, 443 (1959); Phelps Dodge Corp.
v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 191 (1941); Lynch v. Alworth-Stephens Co., 267 U.S.
364, 370 (1925); William J. Moxley v. Hertz, 216 U.S. 344, 356 (1910); Pease
v. Dwight, 47 U.S. 190, 200 (1848); Pace Elecs., Inc. v. Canon Computer Sys.,
213 F.3d 118, 123 (3d. Cir. 2000).
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The argument has two premises and one conclusion. The
first premise, called the “major premise,”63 contains two terms:
“all lawyers” and “people who have passed the bar
examination.”64 The term “all lawyers” is called the middle
term.65 The term “people who have passed the bar
examination” is called the major term.66 The second premise,
called the “minor premise,” also contains two terms: “All

63. The major premise is the premise containing the major term. The
major term is the term that is the predicate of the conclusion. See COPI &
COHEN, supra note 31, at 225.
64. Because practical arguments are rarely made using strict syllogistic
form, rarely express all of the terms of the argument, and rarely express the
elements of argument using consistent terms, evaluation of logical form
frequently requires taking an argument articulated in natural language,
reducing it to its essential terms, and ordering it in a syllogistic form. As one
logician has explained:
Categorical syllogisms, as they occur in ordinary spoken and
written expression, are seldom phrased according to the
precise norms of the standard-form syllogism. Sometimes
quantifiers, premises, or conclusions are left unexpressed,
chains of syllogisms are strung together into single
arguments, and terms are mixed together with their
negations in a single argument.
HURLEY, supra note 26, at 264. While syllogistic form might be an effective
device for crafting and evaluating the logical form of argument, it is not
always an effective device for communicating argument, and lawyers, trained
toward brevity and efficiency in their argument, frequently speak and write
arguments that do not readily expose their logical form. As one commentator
observed more than 150 years ago:
It has been remarked . . . that men are very impatient of
tedious prolixity in Reasoning; and that the utmost
most
compressed
statement
of
brevity,—the
argumentation,—that is compatible with clearness, is
always aimed at, and is indeed conducive to clearness. And
hence, (as was pointed out) a single sentence,—or even a
word—will often be a sufficient hint of an entire syllogism.
RICHARD WHATELY, EASY LESSONS ON REASONING 109-10 (4th ed. 1847).
65. The middle term is the term that occurs in both premises, but not
the conclusion. See COPI & COHEN, supra note 31, at 225.
66. The major term is the term that is the predicate of the conclusion.
See id.
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[people who are] judges” and “[people who are] lawyers.” The
term “All [people who are] judges” is the minor term,67 and the
term “all lawyers” is again called the middle term.68 Finally,
the conclusion contains two terms: “all [people who are] judges”
and “people who have passed the bar examination.”
The Fallacy of Negative Premises focuses on the positive or
negative relationship between the premises and the conclusion.
The rule of logic at issue is the fifth: “If either premise is
negative, the conclusion must be negative.”69 Accordingly, the
issue of this fallacy only arises where a positive conclusion is
purportedly derived from a negative premise.70 For example,
consider the following example of a syllogism:
My lawyer is not a thief.
Thieves are not trustworthy.
Therefore, my lawyer is trustworthy.
In this case, the fifth rule of logic tells us something about why
the logical form of the argument does not allow us to accept the
conclusion. The reason for this is inherent in the nature of the
syllogism and the limited inference that flows from a negative
statement.71 A syllogism tells us something essential about the

id.

67. The minor term is the term that is the subject of the conclusion. See
68.
69.
70.
71.

See supra note 65.
COPI & COHEN, supra note 31, at 247.
Id. at 247-48.
One commentator has described it this way:
This type of reasoning is unacceptable because of the
difficulty in sustaining a factual proposition merely by
negative evidence. When an advocate determines “there is
no evidence that B is the case”; he or she is attempting to
affirm or assume that non-B is the case. But all that is
affirmed or assumed is that the advocate has found no
evidence of non-B. The correct method of proceeding is to
find affirmative evidence of non-B. This may be difficult, but
it is absolutely necessary if logical order is to be preserved.
To prove a negative is sometimes an impossible task. Not
knowing that something exists is simply not knowing.
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relationship between its three terms. If the syllogism follows
the rules of logic and if the major premise and the minor
premise are both true, then the conclusion is true. We could not
infer the conclusion from either the major premise alone or the
minor premise alone. The power of the syllogism is its ability to
ensure the validity of the conclusion based solely on the
relationship between the major premise and minor premise.72
The rules of logic police the integrity of these relationships. The
fifth rule of logic, which requires that if a conclusion is positive,
neither premise may be negative, simply reflects the limited
inferences that can result from a negative premise.
A positive premise tells us something valuable about the
relationship between two terms, such as all As are Bs. A
negative premise tells us something of more limited value, such
as no As are Bs. The positive premise will assure us that some
or all of the major term is also encompassed in the middle
term. This is important information regarding the middle term.
Further, since the middle term allows an inference in the
conclusion about the relationship between the major term and
minor term, a positive premise yields important information
regarding the conclusion. Conversely, a negative premise will
ALDISERT, supra note 57, at 156. Another authority states the reason for the
rule in more technical terms:
The logic behind Rule 4 may be seen as follows. If S, P,
and M . . . designate the minor, major, and middle terms, an
affirmative conclusion always states that the S class is
contained either wholly or partially in the P class. The only
way that such a conclusion can follow is if the S class is
contained either wholly or partially in the M class, and the
M class wholly in the P class. In other words, it follows only
when both premises are affirmative. But if, for example, the
S class is contained either wholly or partially in the M class,
and the M class is separate either wholly or partially from
the P class, such a conclusion will never follow. Thus, an
affirmative conclusion cannot be drawn from negative
premises.
HURLEY, supra note 26, at 259. Notably, this example syllogism also violates
another rule of logic, which prohibits both premises being negatives. See
State v. Lackey discussed infra Part III, for a case example of this fallacy.
72. See COPI & COHEN, supra note 31, at 244-45.
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only tell us something very small about the middle term,
assuring us only that some or all of the major term is not a part
of the middle term.
This is sort of like being in a new city and asking someone
for directions to the local coffee shop. If the person tells you,
“Well, you don’t go down Rose Street,” or “You’ll never get there
if you turn right at the stop light,” these statements are true,
and they might even be important, but they tell you very little
about the best way to get to the coffee shop. The rules of logic
tell us that the conclusion must be a negative one, not a
positive one. Stated otherwise, this fellow’s directions can lead
you to conclude how not to get to the coffee shop, but they
cannot lead you to conclude how to get to the coffee shop.
Stated syllogistically:
All of the best routes to the coffee shop involve driving to
Water Street.
Driving southbound on Rose Street will not lead to Water
Street.
Therefore, driving southbound on Rose Street is not one of
the best routes to the coffee shop.73
This syllogism, which has a negative minor premise, is valid,
but it is limited to a negative (and not particularly helpful)
conclusion. Compare it to the following fallacious syllogism.
All of the best routes to the coffee shop involve driving to
Water Street.
Driving southbound on Rose Street will not lead to Water
Street.
Therefore, driving northbound on Rose Street is one of the
73. The structure of this syllogism could be simplified further to clarify
its logical structure:
The best routes are the routes that lead to Water Street.
A route Southbound on Rose Street is not a route that leads to Water
Street.
Therefore, a route Southbound on Rose Street is not a best route.
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best routes to the coffee shop.74
The conclusion is a bit more tempting, but logically unreliable.
While the minor premise indeed assures us that if we were to
drive southbound on Rose Street we would never reach the
coffee shop, nothing assures us that the inverse would produce
a different result. This is inherent in the limited value of a
negative premise. It can only tell us what is not; it cannot
reliably tell us what is.
There is something subtly alluring about the logically
invalid framework of this kind of illogical argument that makes
us want to accept it, faulty reasoning and all. Psychology
describes the problem in terms of heuristics and the
“atmosphere hypothesis”:
When quantifiers such as “all,” “some,” and
“none” are used within syllogisms, additional
errors in reasoning occur. People are more likely
to accept positive conclusions to positive
premises and negative conclusions to negative
premises, negative conclusions if premises are
mixed, a universal conclusion if premises are
universal (all or none), a particular conclusion if
premises are particular (some), and a particular
conclusion if one premise is general and the other
is particular. These observations led to the
atmosphere hypothesis, which suggests that the
quantifiers within the premises create an
“atmosphere” predisposing subjects to accept as
valid conclusions that use the same quantifiers.75

74. The structure of this syllogism could be simplified further to clarify
its logical structure:
The best routes are the routes that lead to Water Street.
A route southbound on Rose Street is not a route that leads to Water
Street.
Therefore, a route southbound on Rose Street is not the best route.
75. Hubbard, supra note 12, at 1123 (emphasis added).
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If people, particularly legal thinkers and decision-makers, are
psychologically predisposed to “accept negative conclusions if
premises are mixed,” then logical form and formal fallacies
become very important and very practical concerns.
III. Courts Have Recognized the Fallacy of Negative Premises
as Fallacious Reasoning, and Rejected Such Arguments as
Logically Invalid and Unreliable
Of course, if logical form were not a real part of the fabric
of American jurisprudence, the former discussion would have
little relation to what lawyers and judges really do and would
be difficult to apply to practical legal reasoning. However,
logical form is an important part of our jurisprudence and
logical form, and while important theoretically, it is also easily
applied in legal argument. In fact, courts regularly evaluate
logical form—often on a superficial basis, but sometimes in a
more comprehensive fashion. In some cases courts even use the
rules of logic, applying them in much the same fashion as a
substantive legal rule and recognizing them as authoritative in
evaluating legal argument. Courts have used the Fallacy of
Negative Premises as well as the fallacies of Denying the
Antecedent,76 Affirming the Consequent,77 the Fallacy of the

76. See, e.g., Wilson v. Clark, 372 F. App'x 745, 747 (9th Cir. 2010); Arar
v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 601 (2d Cir. 2009); Carver v. Lehman, 528 F.3d
659, 671 (9th Cir. 2008), withdrawn, 540 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir. 2008); AGRI
Processor Co. v. NLRB, 514 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2008); E. Armata, Inc. v.
Korea Commercial Bank of N.Y., 367 F.3d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 2004); Tobey v.
United States, 794 F. Supp. 2d 594, 601 (D. Md. 2011) (citing TorPharm, Inc.
v. Ranbaxy Pharms., Inc., 336 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2003)); Zortman v.
J.C. Christensen & Assocs., Inc., 819 F. Supp. 2d 874, 877 (D. Minn. 2011);
Optigen, LLC v. Int’l Genetics, Inc., 777 F. Supp. 2d 390, 402 n.10 (N.D.N.Y.
2011); Adelphia Recovery Trust v. Bank of Am., No. 05 CIV. 9050, 2010 WL
3452374, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2010); Garcia v. United States, No. 08 Civ.
4733, 2010 WL 1640224, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 21, 2010); Cusamano v. Sobek,
604 F. Supp. 2d 416, 474 n.122 (N.D.N.Y. 2009); IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell,
631 F. Supp. 2d 434, 447 (D. Vt. 2009), rev'd, 630 F.3d 263 (2d Cir. 2010),
aff'd, 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011); Odyssey Marine Exploration, Inc. v.
Unidentified, Shipwrecked Vessel, 675 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1132 n.5 (M.D. Fla.
2009); N.W. Steel Erection Co. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., No. 4:07-CV-3184, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4082, at *4 (D. Neb. Jan. 18, 2008); Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
MFS Commc’ns Co., 901 F. Supp. 835, 849 (D. Del. 1995); Hellweg v. Comm’r
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Undistributed Middle Term,78 and the Fallacy of the Illicit
of Internal Revenue, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1261 (T.C. 2011); Villines v. Harris,
11 S.W.3d 516, 520 n.2 (Ark. 2000); Thomson v. Beuchel, 2007 Cal. App.
LEXIS 6242, at *18 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. July 31, 2007); Thompson v. Clarkson
Power Flow, Inc., 254 S.E.2d 401 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979); French v. State, 362
N.E.2d 834, 843 n.1 (Ind. 1977) (DeBruler, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Mark v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, No. A04-1905, 2005 WL
1089016, at *1 n.3 (Minn. Ct. App. May 10, 2005); Health Pers. v. Peterson,
629 N.W.2d 132, 134 n.3 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Clifford, 121 P.3d
489, 501 (Mont. 2005) (Nelson, J., concurring); State v. Wetzel, 114 P.3d 269,
275-76 (Mont. 2005) (Leaphart, J., dissenting); Dep’t 56, Inc. v. Bloom, 720
N.Y.S.2d 920, 923 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001); Iams v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 883
N.E.2d 466, 478-79 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007); Edwards v. Riverdale Sch. Dist.,
188 P.3d 317, 321 (Or. Ct. App. 2008); Hale v. Water Res. Dep’t, 55 P.3d 497,
502 (Or. Ct. App. 2002); Thompson v. State, 108 S.W.3d 269, 278 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2003) (Keasler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); In re
Luna, 175 S.W.3d 315, 320 n.4 (Tex. App. 2004), withdrawn, In re Luna, 275
S.W.3d 537 (Tex. App. 2008); Zinpro Corp. v. Ridenour, No. 07-96-0008-CV,
1996 Tex. App. LEXIS 3380, at *10 n.4 (Tex. App. Aug. 1, 1996); Manchester
Oaks Homeowners Ass’n v. Batt, 732 S.E.2d 690, 699 (Va. 2012). See Stephen
M. Rice, Conventional Logic: Using the Logical Fallacy of Denying the
Antecedent as a Litigation Tool, 79 MISS. L.J. 669 (2010), for a discussion of
the Denying the Antecedent and its treatment in case law.
77. See, e.g., Gilliam v. Nev. Power Co., 488 F.3d 1189, 1196 n.7 (9th Cir.
2007); In re Stewart Foods, Inc. v. Broecker, 64 F.3d 141, 145 n.3 (4th Cir.
1995); United Tel. Co. of Carolinas, Inc. v. FCC, 559 F.2d 720, 725-26 (D.C.
Cir. 1977); Toussaint v. Good, No. 3:05-CV-443-KRG-KAP, 2008 WL 2994768,
at *2 n.1 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2008), aff'd, 335 F. App'x 158 (3d Cir. 2009);
Topliff v. Wal-Mart Stores E. LP, No. 6:04-CV-0297 (GHL), 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20533, at *183 (N.D.N.Y Mar. 22, 2007); Adams v. La.-Pac. Corp., 284
F. Supp. 2d 331, 338 (W.D.N.C. 2003), rev’d in part, vacated in part, and
remanded, 177 F. App’x 335 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Carlson, 67 M.J.
693, 699 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2009); United States v. Balcarczyk, 52 M.J.
809, 812 n.4 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2000); In re Jeffery, No.H031673, 2008 Cal.
App. LEXIS 7976, at *25 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008); Pirtle v. Cook, 956 S.W.2d 235,
248 (Mo. 1997) (Price, Jr., J., dissenting); City of Green Ridge v. Kreisel, 25
S.W.3d 559, 563 & n.2 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000); Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570,
572 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Daniels v. Empty Eye, Inc., 368 S.W.3d 743, 752
(Tex. App. 2012); Culton v. State, 95 S.W.3d 401, 405 (Tex. App. 2002). See
Stephen M. Rice, Conventional Logic: Using the Logical Fallacy of Affirming
the Consequent as a Litigation Tool, 14 BARRY L. REV. 1 (2010), for a
discussion of the Fallacy of Affirming the Consequent and its treatment in
case law.
78. See, e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 578 (1967) (Warren, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 134 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Allied
Erecting & Dismantling, Co. v. USX Corp., 249 F.3d 191, 202 & n.1 (3d Cir.
2001); Aylett v. Sec’y of Hous. & Urban Dev., 54 F.3d 1560, 1569 (10th Cir.
1995); Hernandez v. Denton, 861 F.2d 1421, 1439 (9th Cir. 1988) (Aldisert, J.,
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Process.79 Accordingly, studying how courts have used the
Fallacy of Negative Premises to decide cases is instructive.
These illustrative cases provide authority for the application of
this rule of logic to the process of legal reasoning.
Recently, the Washington Court of Appeals utilized the
Fallacy of Negative Premises in considering a motion to
concurring in part and dissenting in part); McHugh v. Hillerich & Bradsby
Co., No. C07-03677 JSW, 2010 WL 682339, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2010),
aff'd, 413 F. App'x 240 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Regalado v. City of Chicago, No. 96 C
3634, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14902, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 1999); British
Steel PLC v. United States, 929 F. Supp. 426, 436 n.11 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1996);
Lucas Aerospace, Ltd. v. Unison Indus., L.P., 899 F. Supp. 1268, 1287 (D.
Del. 1995); Foster v. McGrail, 844 F. Supp. 16, 21 (D. Mass. 1994); Pearson v.
Bowen, 648 F. Supp. 782, 792 n.26 (N.D. Ill. 1986); United States v. Gambale,
610 F. Supp. 1515, 1525 (D. Mass. 1985); Amusement Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt,
595 F. Supp. 125, 130 n.4 (E.D. La. 1984), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 779 F.2d
264 (5th Cir. 1985); Menora v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 527 F. Supp. 632, 636
(N.D. Ill. 1981); Lakeland Constr. Co. v. Operative Plasterers & Cement
Masons Local No. 362, No. 79 C 3101, 1981 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11584, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 24, 1981); PPL Corp. v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 135 T.C.
176, 186, 191 n.11 (T.C. 2010); Desilu Prods., Inc. v. Comm’r of Internal
Revenue, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1695 (T.C. 1965); Batty v. Ariz. State Dental Bd.,
112 P.2d 870, 873 (Ariz. 1941); Nickolas F. v. Super. Ct., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 208,
222 n.17 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); People v. Martinez, 74 P.3d 316, 321 (Colo.
2003); Royer v. State, 389 So. 2d 1007, 1016 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979);
Barham v. Richard, 692 So. 2d 1357, 1359 (La. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Star
Enter., 691 So. 2d 1221, 1229 n.8 (La. Ct. App. 1996); Wein v. Carey, 362
N.E.2d 587, 590-91 (N.Y. 1977); Hicks v. State, 241 S.W.3d 543, 546 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007); Rushing v. Commonwealth, 726 S.E.2d 333, 338 n.2 (Va.
2012); State v. Zespy, 723 P.2d 564, 570 n.1 (Wyo. 1986) (Urbigkit, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). See Stephen M. Rice,
Indispensable Logic: Using the Logical Fallacy of the Undistributed Middle as
a Litigation Tool, 43 AKRON L. REV. 79 (2010), for a discussion of the Fallacy
of the Undistributed Middle and its treatment in case law.
79. See, e.g., Cook v. Moffat, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 295, 299 (1847); Walmsley
v. City of Philadelphia, 872 F.2d 546, 554 (3d Cir. 1989) (Aldisert, J.,
dissenting); Posey v. State, No. CACR 04-610, 2005 WL 1168401, at *2 (Ark.
Ct. App. May 18, 2005); State v. Lackey, 208 P.3d 793, 797 (Kan. Ct. App.
2009), rev’d, 286 P.3d 859 (Kan. 2012); Ochsner v. Idealife Ins. Co., 945 So. 2d
128, 135 (La. Ct. App. 2006) (Kirby, J., dissenting); Bailey v. State, 294 A.2d
123, 129 n.4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972); Council of Orgs. & Others for Educ.
about Parochiaid v. Governor of Mich., 548 N.W.2d 909, 920 n.7 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1996) (O’Connell, J., dissenting). See generally In re Collom’s Estate, 28
Pa. D. 503, 505 (Orph. 1919). See Stephen M. Rice, Indiscernible Logic: Using
the Logical Fallacies of the Illicit Major Term and the Illicit Minor Term as
Litigation Tools, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 101 (2010), for a discussion of the
Fallacies of Illicit Process (also known as the fallacies of the Illicit Major
Term and Illicit Minor Term) and their treatment in case law.
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suppress evidence.80 In State v. Weber, the defendant moved to
suppress evidence obtained by the State after a Washington
state trooper stopped the defendant.81 The trooper observed the
defendant failing to stop before pulling into the street and
speeding at 2:53 a.m.82 The trooper pulled over the defendant
and administered a sobriety test, which the defendant failed.83
Breath tests revealed the defendant was driving under the
influence of alcohol.84 The trooper testified that while he is
“always looking for DUI’s” he stopped the defendant for failing
to stop and for exceeding the posted speed limit.85 The
defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained after the
stop, claiming the stop was a pretext.86 The trial court granted
the motion,87 but the decision was subsequently reversed by the
superior court.88
The Washington Court of Appeals reviewed the findings of
fact and scrutinized the basis for the trial court’s conclusion
that the stop was a pretext to investigate whether the
defendant was operating his vehicle under the influence of
alcohol:
The trial court did not make any express
statement about the trooper’s credibility, nor did
it squarely find what motivated him to make the
traffic stop. While we have an obligation to
reasonably infer facts from the trial court’s
judgment, it is difficult to determine what should
be inferred here. Perhaps it could be inferred
that the officer was motivated by something
other than enforcing the speeding law, although
there is not much in the record to support such

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See State v. Weber, 247 P.3d 782 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011).
Id. at 782.
Id.
Id. at 782-83.
Id. at 783.
Id. at 783-84 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 783.
Id. at 785.
Id.
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an inference. To go any further and infer a
specific motivation, however, fails on two
accounts. First, nothing in the record would
support such an inference, and a reviewing court
must only infer facts that have substantial
evidentiary support in the record. Second, it is
a long-recognized logical fallacy to draw an
affirmative conclusion from a negative
premise. Thus, even if a reviewing court infers
that the trial court factually found the trooper
was not motivated to enforce the traffic law, it is
not in a position to infer what the motive
actually was.89
The court went on to affirm the superior court’s reversal of the
trial court’s order to suppress the evidence as being obtained
from a pretextual stop.90
In light of the discussion, supra, of the relationship
between the fallacy and argumentative form, one might be
surprised that the legal arguments here are never explicitly
deconstructed into their basic logical form. This is one of
practical
benefits
of
the
Fallacy
of
Negative Premises: It is simple to spot. It is evidence from a
negative premise and a positive conclusion. Here, the fallacious
pattern is evident without the need to deconstruct the
argument into a strict syllogism. The court was considering
whether the conclusion, “the trooper made a stop motivated by
something other than enforcing a speeding law” could be
supported by a premise like, “there is no evidence of the
trooper’s actual motivation.”91

89. Id. at 786-87 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
90. Id. at 788. The court utilized the Fallacy of Negative Premises to
explain why the superior court’s opinion reversing the trial court could not be
based on a fallacious argument. It did so in the course of assuring itself of the
logic of the superior court’s limited substantiation of its decision to reverse
the trial court. The court of appeals went on to affirm the superior court’s
reversal of the trial court’s decision that the stop was pretextual. Id. at 791.
91. See id. at 786-87.
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Next, in State v. Lackey,92 a court used the Fallacy of
Negative Premises to evaluate an appellant’s claim that
further DNA testing should have been conducted in his rape
and murder trial. The appellant in this case was convicted of
raping and murdering a young woman.93 The evidence used to
prove the appellant’s guilt involved DNA testing.94 The DNA
was consistent with the appellant’s, and he was found guilty of
first-degree murder and rape.95 However, on appeal, the
appellant claimed that further DNA testing should have been
done on other evidence samples.96 The appellant based his
argument in part on a Kansas statute that states that any
person found guilty of murder may petition a court for further
DNA testing.97 The court noted that this statute applied to any
DNA testing that could produce “noncumulative, exculpatory
evidence.”98 Because of this interpretation of the statute, the
court found that the appellant’s motion should be denied due to
the Fallacy of Negative Premises.99
The court explained that the appellant used the fact that
not all DNA samples were tested from the crime scene as a
premise of his argument.100 It further stated specifically that
the hairs were not tested from the victim’s body.101 Hence,
those hairs should be tested. The appellant’s argument forms
the following categorical syllogism:
“Not all DNA samples were tested [Major Premise];
Hairs found on the victim’s body were not tested [Minor
Premise];
Therefore, the hairs found on the victim’s body should be

92. 208 P.3d 793 (Kan. App. 2009).
93. Id. at 795.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 796.
96. Id. at 797.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 798.
99. Id. at 797-98.
100. Id. at 797.
101. Id.
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tested [Conclusion].”102
The court recognized that the argument, as stated, is
fallacious.103 The argument contains a negative premise; thus,
no positive conclusion can be made.104 In this case, the
appellant’s argument has two negative premises and an
affirmative conclusion and is consequently guilty of the Fallacy
of Exclusive Premises.105
The court suggested that the appellant might have reformed an argument based on the Kansas statute to avoid the
violation of a rule of logic.106 However, such a re-formed
argument would have to be based on the positive premise that
additional DNA testing would “produce noncumulative,
exculpatory evidence” to logically support a positive
conclusion.107 The court rejected this argument because the
DNA testing would not produce exculpatory evidence. In other
words, while such a restructured argument would take a
logically valid form, the conclusion would fail because the court

102. Id.
103. Id. While the court is correct in recognizing that the syllogism
cannot support a positive conclusion and that it commits the fallacy of the
negative premise, the syllogism is otherwise deficient. The major premise
contains two terms: “DNA samples” and “samples [that] were tested.” The
minor premise contains two terms: “hairs found on the victim’s body” and
“[samples] that were not tested.” The conclusion only references the two
terms found in the minor premise: “hairs found on the victim’s body” and
“[samples] that were not tested.”
104. The court also recognized that the syllogism posed by the court
contains two negative premises, which violates yet another rule of logic (i.e.,
that two negative premises are not allowed). This is known as the Fallacy of
Exclusive Premises. See PATRICK J. HURLEY, A CONCISE INTRODUCTION TO
LOGIC 266 (10th ed. 2008). See also NORMAN L. GEISLER & RONALD M. BROOKS,
COME, LET US REASON: AN INTRODUCTION TO LOGICAL THINKING 41 (1990) (“If
nothing from one group has anything in common with anything from another
group, there is nothing you can say about the two groups in common. As
Richard Rodgers’ popular song said, ‘Nothing comes from nothing: nothing
ever could.’ This is often called the fallacy of ‘Exclusive Premises’ because the
two negative premises exclude the possibility of any relation between them.”).
105. Lackey, 208 P.3d at 797-98 (citing ALDISERT, supra note 57, at 14546).(“Lackey’s syllogistic argument violates both Rules 4 and 5 of categorical
syllogism: it has two negative premises and an affirmative conclusion.”).
106. Id. at 798.
107. Id.
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did not accept the truth of the required premise.108
The Fallacy of Negative Premises was used in another case
to reveal a logical fallacy in a legal conclusion and to teach a
valuable lesson about statutory drafting. In City of Wichita v.
Stevenson,109 the court was faced with the application of a
simple city ordinance. The ordinance110 provided, in the
applicable part, that “No person shall permit overcrowding or
admittance of any person beyond the approved capacity of a
building or a portion thereof.”111 The appellant was convicted of
violating the ordinance on three occasions in 2009.112 She was
present at a tavern called Harry & Ollie’s in Wichita, Kansas,
on each of those three occasions.113 However, she argued that
she was neither the owner nor a manager on duty on any of the
three occasions for which she was charged, but merely a patron
drinking and socializing in a tavern.114 Appellant’s legal

108. Id. at 798-99. Logicians recognize a distinction between an
argument that is logically “valid” and an argument that is “true.” Logical
validity is a function of complying with rules of logic. If the rules are followed,
then the argument’s form is valid. However, an argument’s valid form does
not necessarily mean the conclusion is true. Truth (or falsity) is an attribute
of the individual propositions that appear within an argument. Accordingly,
the logical form of an argument is either valid or invalid; it is neither true nor
false. Conversely, the premises of an argument are either true or false; they
are neither valid nor invalid. These distinct concepts of truth and falsity,
validity and invalidity, work together. When the logical form of an argument
is valid, and its premises are true, then the argument requires that the
conclusion be true. If either a premise is false, or the form is invalid, the
conclusion cannot necessarily be true. See COPI & COHEN, supra note 31, at
30-31.
109. City of Wichita v. Stevenson, 265 P.3d 598 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011).
110. Id. at *1.
111. Id.
112. Id. at *1-2.
113. Id. at *1.
114. Id. (“Stevenson argued the ordinance unconstitutionally failed to
place limits on who police officers could cite for permitting overcrowding as
evidenced by the fact that (1) she was not the owner of Harry & Ollie’s, (2)
she was not the manager on duty on February 7, April 11, or April 18, 2009,
and (3) although she was in the bar on all three occasions, it was only
because she was socializing with friends.”); see also Brief of Appellant, at *2,
City of Wichita v. Stevenson, 265 P.3d 598 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011) (No. 09 CR
2601), 2010 WL 5626644 (“The defendant, Patricia Stevenson, was one of the
managers of Harry and Ollies. Ms. Stevenson's daughter, Kristie McNeil, was
the owner of the tavern. Ms. Stevenson ordinarily worked 30 hours a week,
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argument on appeal was that the ordinance was
unconstitutionally vague, since the term “no person” did not
define who was responsible for ensuring compliance with the
statute.115
The court disagreed, ultimately holding that “[n]o person
shall permit overcrowding”
makes it clear that the individual who is culpable
under the ordinance is the individual who
actually permits the building to be over capacity.
It is the responsibility of the police and fire
departments to determine who permits, gives
consent, authorizes, makes possible, or gives
opportunity for the building to be occupied over
capacity. The common and well-understood
meaning of the word “permit” provides a clear
standard for those who enforce the ordinance.116
However, the dissenting judge would have held otherwise,
and he justified his conclusion in terms of logical form,
specifically, the Fallacy of Negative Premises:
Subsection 15.01.480 of the Wichita City
Ordinance states: “No person shall permit
overcrowding or admittance of any person
beyond the approved capacity of a building or a
portion thereof.” Stevenson alleges that this
subsection of the ordinance is unconstitutionally
vague because the word “person” could mean
“any human being.” And “person” is a term that
can be applied without limitation. Stevenson is
correct. For example, “[n]o person shall permit
overcrowding”
is
a
universal
negative

and worked only the day shift. Although she did not work the night shift,
occasionally Ms. Stevenson met friends at Harry and Ollies in the evening, to
drink and socialize.”) (citations omitted).
115. Stevenson, 265 P.3d at *3.
116. Id. at *5.
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proposition: all persons are excluded from the
class of things that allow overcrowding; and all
members of the class of things that allow
overcrowding are excluded from the class of
persons. Thus, “[n]o person shall permit
overcrowding” asserts that if anyone is a person,
then he or she will not allow overcrowding. This
negative premise can be reconstructed into the
following syllogism:
Major Premise: No person shall permit
overcrowding.
Minor Premise: The bartender is a
person.
Conclusion: Therefore, the bartender
shall not allow overcrowding.
By not explaining who is “no person,” the
ordinance is deficient. Persons of common
intelligence would be required to guess at the
phrase’s meaning and differ as to how the
regulations should be enforced. For example, the
ordinance contains no guidelines to assist either
a person who desires to know whether he or she
is the person who is not to allow overcrowding or
an official who is charged with the enforcement
of the ordinance.117
Judge Henry W. Green, Jr., wrote the dissenting opinion in
City of Wichita v. Stevenson. He also wrote the majority opinion
in State v. Lackey. While Judge Green does not provide an
explanation of the Fallacy of Negative Premises in City of
Wichita v. Stevenson, his recitation of this rule of logic from
State v. Lackey is just as applicable here: “[I]f one premise is
negative, the conclusion must be negative.”118 Accordingly, logic

117. Id. at *5-6 (Green, J., dissenting).
118. State v. Lackey, 208 P.3d 793, 797 (Kan. App. 2009).
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precludes drawing a positive conclusion from a negative
premise, such as “no person shall permit overcrowding.”
Similarly, in the case of Ochsner v. Idealife Insurance
Company,119 the dissenting judge pointed out how the appellate
court committed the Fallacy of Negative Premises when it
rendered its opinion. In Ochsner, the appellant, the surviving
spouse of the insured, was attempting to compel the insured’s
life insurance company to pay death benefits to the
appellant.120 The insurer claimed that the insured had quit
paying his policy premiums nine years before his death.121 As a
result, the insurer cancelled the insured’s life insurance
without giving notice to him.122 The court ruled that Louisiana
statute provided that “No life insurer shall within one year
after default in payment of any premium, . . . declare
forfeited or lapsed any policy . . . [without giving the
statutorily prescribed notice].”123 The insurer argued that it
provided notice of cancellation to the insured’s bank, but not to
the insured himself.124 However, the court held that the notice
of cancellation sent to the bank did not meet the requirements
of the statute.125
The insurer focused on the “within one year” provision of
the statute to argue that since the nonpayment of the premium
extended beyond one year, no written notice was required.126
The insurer argued that accordingly, after one year of
nonpayment, “all life insurers shall declare the subject policy
forfeited or lapsed” regardless of notice.127 The court accepted
this argument. However, the dissenting judges evaluated the
argument in terms of logical form and opined that such a
119. 945 So. 2d 128 (La. Ct. App. 2006).
120. Id. at 129-30.
121. Id. at 130.
122. Id. The policy had been pledged to the insured’s bank, which later
assigned its interest in the policy to an assignee. Id. The insurer also
assigned and delegated its rights and obligations under the policy to another
entity. Id.
123. Id. at 135 (Kirby, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 131.
125. Id. at 131.
126. Id. at 132.
127. Id. at 135 (Kirby, J., dissenting).
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conclusion could not logically be drawn from the negative
premise upon which the argument was based, since doing so
would require one to draw an affirmative conclusion from a
negative premise.128 Here, the dissenting opinion does not even
arrange the argument into a syllogism. Instead, it simply relies
on the simple rule of logic that one cannot reach any
affirmative conclusion (All life insurance policies unpaid after a
year must lapse) from a negative premise (“No life insurer shall
within one year after default in payment of any premium . . .
declare . . . lapsed any policy . . . [without giving the statutorily
prescribed notice].”).129
The Fallacy of Negative Premises was also an analytical
tool in the dissent in Walmsley v. City of Philadelphia.130 In
Walmsley, an expert witness in a police brutality case testified
that a man died from multiple blows to the head.131 The
plaintiff argued that the blows occurred as a result of police
brutality, while the police claimed that the man died from
blows received in a fight that occurred prior to any police
confrontation.132 The parties agreed that prior to entering
128. Id.
129. Id. (emphasis omitted). The dissent evaluated logical form in the
context of the rules of statutory construction: “When the language of the law
can have multiple meanings La. C.C. art. 10 mandates us to give it the
meaning that best conforms to the purpose of the law.” Id. at 136.
130. Walmsley v. City of Philadelphia, 872 F.2d 546, 554 (3d Cir. 1989).
131. Id. at 547-48.
132. Id. More specifically, expert testimony suggested:
[T]hese injuries were almost certainly caused by multiple
blows to the head with a blunt instrument. An expert also
testified that it was the head/scalp injuries, rather than the
facial injuries, which caused the brain swelling resulting in
Thomas Walmsley's death. Although a toxicology report
produced after the autopsy also disclosed lethal levels of
barbiturates and diazepam in Thomas Walmsley's (“Tom”)
body, an expert testified that in his opinion these drugs
were not responsible for the brain swelling that caused
Tom's death. That expert also testified that it was unlikely
Tom's injuries could have resulted from a fall, resulting in
contact with a wall or rock, or from a fistfight, due to their
severity, location, and the lack of external abrasions. He
opined that it was possible the injuries were the result of
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police custody, the deceased had been in a fight with his
brother, and that near the end of the fight the deceased was
struck two or three times in the face.133 Sometime after the
fight, police arrived and took the deceased into custody. While
the police were transporting him to the police station, the
deceased lost consciousness and died.134 The deceased’s family
claimed that before the police confrontation, they had an
opportunity to observe the deceased, brushed his hair back
from his face, and saw no lumps on his head.135 Afterwards,
however, lumps were visible.136 The plaintiff argued that since
the witnesses observed no lumps before the police
confrontation, but observed them after, the lumps must not
have been caused by the fight that preceded the
confrontation.137
The court found that this testimony was enough evidence
for a jury to reasonably infer that the police caused the man’s
death. Further, sufficient circumstantial evidence was given by
the plaintiff to permit a jury to conclude that the man had been
involved with the police when he received the injuries. The
dissenting judge, Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert,138 argued that
because no direct evidence was presented, the court should not
have ruled that the police could have caused the injuries.139 He
explained that the court gave too much weight to the family’s
claim that no lumps were observed on the deceased’s head

being clubbed with a nightstick.
Id. at 548 (citations omitted).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 550.
135. Id. at 550-51.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 554 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
138. The dissenting judge is Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert, Senior Judge for
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting by
designation. Judge Aldisert has written several opinions discussing logic in
legal argument. He is the author of other works specifically addressing
formal logic in legal reasoning, including Logic for Lawyers: A Guide to Clear
Legal Thinking and Logic For Law Students: How To Think Like A Lawyer in
addition to several other books focusing on the judicial process.
139. Walmsley, 872 F.2d at 553.
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before he was in police custody.140 Judge Aldisert observed that
this was particularly true in light of the fact that there was no
evidence that the family members looked for lumps on the
deceased’s head after the fight with his brother.141 From this,
an inference was drawn that there were no bumps on the head
before the confrontation, but such an inference was
inappropriate in these circumstances.142 Accordingly, Judge
Aldisert would have held that the appellant’s argument
committed the Fallacy of Negative Premises and should have
been rejected by the court.143
Judge Aldisert succinctly identified what is wrong with
this fallacious pattern of reasoning:
This type of reasoning is unacceptable because of
the difficulty in sustaining a factual proposition
merely by negative evidence. When an advocate
determines that there is no evidence that B
(bumps on the head) is the case; he or she is
attempting to affirm or assume that non-B is the
case. But all that is affirmed or assumed is that
the advocate has found no evidence of non-B. The
correct method of proceeding is to find
affirmative evidence of non-B. This may be
difficult, but it is absolutely necessary if logical
order is to be preserved. To prove a negative is
sometimes an impossible task. Not knowing that
something exists is simply not knowing.
Similarly, not knowing that Walmsley hit his
head during the fight with his brother does not
imply that he did or did not hit his head.144
In Kolakowski v. Secretary of Health and Human Services,
the Fallacy of Negative Premises was utilized again by a court

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
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evaluating a claimant’s argument.145 However, in this case one
might take issue with how the court implemented the rule of
logic. In Kolakowski, the plaintiffs filed a petition for
compensation under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
of 1986.146 They alleged that their son had died as a result of
the Thimerosal contained in two Hepatitis B vaccinations.147
One of the issues in the case involved the impact of a “safety
reference dose” on the claimants’ argument.148 The court
critiqued the claimants’ argument in terms of formal logic,
specifically, the Fallacy of Negative Premises:
A large point of confusion, that apparently
confused Petitioners in their brief, concerns the
safety reference dose. This dose is an amount of
the substance which, if no more than that
amount is consumed daily (on average), adverse
outcomes are all but certain to be avoided. In
every instance, it assumes a value from the most
sensitive data points recorded, and adds orders of
magnitude whenever there is an ambiguity.
Suffice it to say that it is a logical fallacy
(“affirmative conclusion from a negative
premise”) to use the following statement: “IF the
reference dose of methyl mercury is not exceeded
in average daily consumption, THEN no adverse
outcomes will result,” in order to conclude
through reformulation that “IF an amount of
ethyl mercury over the reference dose of methyl
mercury is consumed on two separate days of a
series, but not every day or in very large
amounts, THEN adverse outcomes will result.”149
145. Kolakowski v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs, No. 99-0625V, 2010
WL 5672753, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 23, 2010).
146. Id. at *1.
147. Id.
148. Id. at *132-33.
149. Id. at 133. Notably, the court went on to explain this line of
reasoning further, again, in terms of deductive logic:
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The court here reduces the plaintiff’s argument to the following
syllogism:
“If the reference dose of methyl mercury is not exceeded in
average daily consumption, then no adverse outcomes will
result.”150

Aside from this obvious fallacy, there is also present in that
formulation the “quantifier-shift fallacy” of attributing to
ethyl mercury the precise characteristics of methyl mercury,
mercury chloride, or elemental mercury: Even if ethyl
mercury is a form of mercury (which in some dosage is toxic
or lethal, depending on its form), and shares characteristics
with all forms of mercury (most of all methyl mercury as
another organomercurial), it does not logically follow, as a
deductive exercise, that ethyl mercury shares every
characteristic of the others. If it does not, then part of
proving that ethyl mercury damages infants would include
an inductive course of determining exactly what ethyl
mercury is capable of, and its precise characteristics as a
substance. It is improper even to begin from the same
reference dose as methyl mercury, for that matter. Dr.
Lucier
subjectively
weighed
attributes
that
are
qualitatively, not just quantitatively, distinct, in order to
arrive at his judgment that ethyl mercury is just as toxic as
methyl mercury. The Court does not accept such a premise
as proven, without some objective standard to assess his
balancing of toxicity factors. Moreover, that opinion is not
corroborated by the medical literature filed in this case. Dr.
Lucier admitted as much when he said that regulatory
agencies, in the interest of efficiency, will study chemical
groups instead of individual chemicals, and their practice in
doing so is to pick the most toxic of the group to study, and
assign a reference dose. Noticeably, not one of the
regulatory agencies discussed herein ever thought to study
ethyl mercury for this purpose instead of methyl mercury.
Despite this, Dr. Lucier's opinion concerning the toxicity of
ethyl mercury in thimerosal was based throughout on the
supposition either that ethyl mercury was the same as
methyl mercury, or that it was even more toxic.
Id. (emphasis added).
150. Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/3

44

120

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:1

The reference dose of methyl mercury was exceeded in
average daily consumption.
Therefore, adverse outcomes will result.151
The court’s syllogism takes the form of a hypothetical
syllogism,152 rather than the categorical syllogism153 described
above. Since the Fallacy of Negative Premises results from the
violation of one of the rules of categorical syllogisms,154 one
could be critical of the court’s application of this syllogistic rule
to the argument as articulated by the court.155
Nonetheless, the court appears to have arrived at a correct
conclusion, criticizing the logical form of the syllogism. The
syllogism described by the court appears to commit another
formal fallacy, the Fallacy of Denying the Antecedent. This
fallacy results from violating the rule required of hypothetical
syllogisms. The rule has been summarized this way: “A valid
hypothetical syllogism either denies the consequent . . . or
affirms the antecedent . . . of the major premise; it doesn’t deny
the antecedent or affirm the consequent.”156 Since the
hypothetical syllogism described by the court denies the
antecedent term, it cannot support its conclusion.157

151. See id.
152. See supra text accompanying note 39.
153. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
154. The five syllogistic rules, including the rule that requires that if
either premise is negative, the conclusion must be negative, apply only to
standard-form categorical syllogism. See COPI & COHEN, supra note 31, at
249.
155. Of course, the syllogism does include a negative premise. The
syllogism might be reduced to symbols and considered this way:
If A, then B.
Not A.
Therefore, not B.
The premise “the reference dose of methyl mercury was exceeded in average
daily consumption” (symbolized as “not A” in the syllogism above) is a
negation of the term “the reference dose of methyl mercury is not exceeded in
average daily consumption” (“if A” in the syllogism above).
156. GEISLER & BROOKS, supra note 104, at 65.
157. See Rice, supra note 76, for an article describing the Fallacy of
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Even if the argument is couched in terms of a categorical
syllogism, it in fact commits the Fallacy of Negative Premise.
Hypothetical syllogisms can be “reduced” or converted to
categorical syllogisms.158 For example, the syllogism at issue in
the lawsuit could be formed as follows:
All reference doses of methyl mercury within the
average daily consumption are not doses that will
produce adverse outcomes.
The reference dose of methyl mercury at issue in
this case was not a dose of methyl mercury within
the average daily consumption.
Therefore, the reference dose of methyl mercury at
issue in this case is a dose that will produce adverse
outcomes.159
Since both the major and minor premises contain a negative
term, the court was correct in recognizing that the argument
cannot support the positive conclusion advanced by the
claimants.

Denying the Antecedent and illustrating its application by courts.
158. “The authority of the rules operative in the hypothetical syllogism
is found in the more extensive and fundamental legislation of the categorical
syllogism . . . . To see this we need only to lift the ‘if’ out of the more flexible
syllogism and put our argument into firmer [categorical] form.” CHARLES
GRAY SHAW, LOGIC IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 172 (1935). See also JOHN
LEECHMAN, LOGIC: DESIGNED AS AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF REASONING
86-87 (1864) (providing more detailed instruction on reducing hypothetical
syllogisms to categorical syllogisms).
159. Reduced to symbols for clarity, the syllogism can be stated:
All As are not Bs.
All Cs are not As.
Therefore, all Cs are Bs.
“A” is equivalent to “reference doses of methyl mercury within the average
daily consumption.” “B” is equivalent to “dose[s] that will produce adverse
outcomes.” “C” is equivalent to “the reference dose of methyl mercury at issue
in this case.”
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IV. Recognizing the Fallacy of Negative Premise and Using it
to Defeat Fallacious Reasoning
After considering these examples and authorities, a
pattern emerges that demystifies the Fallacy of Negative
Premises as it commonly appears in legal argumentation. The
pattern mirrors the rule of logic requiring that a negative
premise cannot yield a positive conclusion. Some patterns will
meet the requirements of this rule: a negative premise and a
negative conclusion; a positive premise and a positive
conclusion. One pattern will not meet the requirements of this
rule: a negative premise and a positive conclusion.
Of course, the fact that the argument passes one rule does
not necessarily mean that the argument is logically sound,
since there are four or five other rules that it must comply
with.160 However, this is one of the benefits of fallacy-based
legal reasoning. Lawyers are not always busy making perfect
arguments. Frequently, the role of a judge or lawyer is to spot
bad arguments. Spotting a bad argument can be as simple as
understanding that the argument fails one rule of logic. So,
fallacy-based legal reasoning is the process of using one’s
knowledge of the patterns of fallacious logical form to spot an
invalid argument and explain why it is invalid. The process
begins with being attentive to arguments that fit the patterns
of invalid logical form—like, for example, the Fallacy of
Negative Premises. A negative premise is straightforward to
spot.
For example:
No contract to perform an illegal act is enforceable; or
Laypersons are not competent to testify as expert
witnesses; or
Gratuitous promises are not enforceable under the doctrine
of consideration.
Once a negative premise is spotted, examining the

160. See supra note 41.
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argument can test the conclusion. In order to comport with this
rule of logic, it must be stated in the negative. A positive
conclusion will fail the test, and the argument is not reliable.
For example:
No fugitive from justice is eligible to obtain a concealedweapon permit.
The plaintiff is not a fugitive from justice.
Plaintiff is eligible to apply for a concealed-weapon permit.
No contract to perform an illegal act is enforceable.
The contract at issue in this litigation concerns a legal act.
Therefore, the contract at issue in this litigation is
enforceable.
Laypersons are not competent to testify as expert
witnesses.
Mr. Flashburger is a layperson.
Therefore, Mr. Flashburger is competent to testify as a fact
witness.
Gratuitous promises are not enforceable under the doctrine
of consideration.
The defendant’s promise was not gratuitous.
Therefore, the defendant’s promise is enforceable.
None of the defendants listed in the complaint will be
found guilty of fraud.
None of the shareholders of the corporation were listed as
defendants in the complaint.
Therefore, all of the shareholders will be found guilty of
fraud.
Some intentional conduct is not tortious.
Battery is tortious.
Therefore, battery is not intentional conduct.
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In the harsh light of the syllogistic form, some of these
examples appear silly enough that they would not likely be
advanced outside of logic textbooks and law review articles.
However, they are illustrative of this fallacious pattern of
argument, further revealed by reducing the arguments to
symbols:
No As are Bs.
All Bs are Cs.
Therefore, all As are Cs.
or
Some As are not Bs.
All Bs are Cs.
Therefore, all As are Cs.
It is more likely that in practical legal argument, the Fallacy of
Negative Premises takes a subtler, less formalistic, less
syllogistic form. Whatever the form, the fallacy begins with a
negative and ends with an affirmative. For example:
Since no federal court is vested with jurisdiction to hear
this lawsuit, jurisdiction must be vested in this state
court.161
Since the relationship between the lawyers did not have
the indicia of a general partnership, they must have been
engaged in an employment relationship.

161. See Tri-Boro Bagel Co. v. Bakery Drivers Union Local 802, 228 F.
Supp. 720 (E.D.N.Y. 1963). In Tri-Boro Bagel, the court observed “[i]t is
fallacious to reason from the negative. ‘No Court of the United States' is
vested with power, to an affirmative that state courts must therefore be
possessed of such authority. The technical name logicians assign to the
paralogism is the fallacy of ‘false opposition’ or ‘false disjunction.’” Id. at 724
n.11 (citation omitted). The case was cited as an example of the fallacy of the
negative premise in Ruggero J. Aldisert’s Logic for Lawyers, A Guide to Clear
Thinking. ALDISERT, supra note 57, at 2.
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Since the defendant was acquitted of first-degree murder,
he must be considered an innocent man.
In each argument, the hallmark of the fallacy is reaching an
affirmative conclusion based on a negative premise. Stated
otherwise, the arguments attempt to argue for a classification
based on what is not within the class. While these conclusions
may be correct, they need some other argument to support
them. One cannot compel a positive conclusion based on
negative claims, any more than one can learn the best way to
travel to a destination based on instructions on how not to get
there.
The import of spotting this type of fallacious argument is
amplified when we consider our human attraction to the very
element of such arguments that makes them necessarily
unreliable: superficial heuristics. For example, consider this
study of the psychological effect of a negative premise on a
hearer’s persuasion. If your faith in the power of human
reasoning leads you to expect that because it includes a false
premise and a positive conclusion, people were more likely to
reject the argument, you might find your faith challenged:
In Experiment 1, participants were asked to
choose the stronger of two arguments, one with a
single positive premise and the identical
argument with an additional negative premise.
Shostakovich elicits alpha waves.
Music of AC/DC does not.
Bach elicits alpha waves.
Shostakovich elicits alpha waves.
Bach elicits alpha waves.162
The experiment revealed that the participants were more likely
to accept the argument that is based on a negative premise
162. Heussen, supra note 10, at 1498.
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than the argument without one.163
V. Conclusion: Persuasive Reason, Superficial Heuristics, and
the Practical Value of Logical Form
The psychology of superficial heuristics, like “atmosphere
effects”164 or “representativeness heuristic,”165 reminds us of
our human tendency to avoid sound logic and gives us
important reasons to think critically and intentionally about
the logical form of legal argument. Of course, there are many
other reasons. Ultimately, logical form is an important
distinguishing characteristic of the process of legal reasoning.
It is important because attention to logical form, the
“architecture of argument,”166 is one method of avoiding
capricious or prejudiced decision-making. Additionally, it is
important because it helps legal thinkers avoid the
consequences of bad judgments resulting from faulty
heuristics. Understanding logical form is important because it
provides a tool, a sort of metalanguage, for evaluating the
logical characteristics of legal argument. Moreover, it is a tool
that helps us distinguish logically sound legal reasoning from
logically fallacious legal reasoning, which is important
considering that fallacious arguments often sound valid, when
in fact they are necessarily invalid.
Because logically fallacious reasoning is a risk to sound
reasoning, law students, lawyers, and judges would do well to
think intentionally about logical form and to educate
themselves regarding the hallmarks of fallacious reasoning.
One simple tool in the pursuit of such an education is a basic
understanding of the rules of logic and the formal logical
fallacies that result from violation of those rules. One such rule
is the Fallacy of Negative Premises, the subject of this Article.
This Article cites more than 80 contemporary legal
163. Id. at 1505 (concluding that the authors’ research in inductive
reasoning “provides empirical evidence for the idea that negative evidence
can increase argument strength”).
164. See supra note 6.
165. See supra note 12.
166. See generally Raymond, supra note 25.
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decisions utilizing formal logical fallacies to support or refute
legal argument. The fallacies are the result of legal reasoning
that fails to adhere to simple logical rules. It is important to
realize that knowing even one rule of formal logic can yield
significant results. One rule of logic states that negative
premises cannot support affirmative conclusions. If an advocate
attempts to justify his affirmative conclusion based on a
negative premise, the argument fails, and the advocate must
find some other justification for his claim.
Moreover, the science of psychology might provide us with
motivation to evaluate such an argument and to evaluate the
faulty logic of an opposing legal argument first, rather than as
a last resort. If legal decision-makers are predisposed to
superficial heuristics, then they are predisposed to accept
logically unsound, necessarily unreliable, legal arguments.
This psychological predisposition to accept arguments that
superficially “sound logical,” but are not, is an important
vulnerability. Understanding logical form, learning the role of
logic in legal decision-making and argument, and identifying
logical fallacies (like the Fallacy of Negative Premises), are
important but frequently ignored skills in evaluating sound
legal argument and in using logic in the art of persuasion.
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